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conTEnTs
India and the EU launched negotiations 
on a far-ranging free trade agreement 
(FTA) in 2007, including trade in goods, 
the deregulation of services, investment, 
government procurement and the strict 
enforcement of intellectual property 
rights. The aim is to conclude the agree-
ment in early 2011. But there are major 
concerns, prompted by the scant infor-
mation that has emerged from the 
negotiations, that the EU-India FTA will 
in fact fuel poverty, inequality and envi-
ronmental destruction.
This report examines industry‘s demands 
and corporate lobbying strategies on 
both sides of the talks. Powerful corpo-
rate sectors, including banking, retail and 
manufacturing, are demanding access to 
the Indian market – exposing rural farm-
ers, small traders and businesses to crush-
ing competition. Big Pharma‘s proposals 
to strengthen intellectual property rights 
could endanger the availability of afford-
able generic medicines for the treatment 
of AIDS, cancer and malaria, not just in 
India but across the developing world. In 
Europe, corporate India‘s market access 
agenda is likely to lead to job losses in the 
automobile and textiles sector, increased 
pressure on health, quality and labour 
standards.
The report also highlights how business 
interests have been granted privileged 
access to policy makers on both sides 
of the negotiations, allowing them to 
effectively set the FTA agenda. The is-
sues raised by public interest groups, in 
contrast, have been largely ignored.
When India Inc. meets Global Europe
With saturated markets and stagnant 
growth rates at home, EU businesses and 
politicians are keen to get unhampered 
access to the vast Indian market. They 
have identified the FTA with India as one 
of the priorities for the EU‘s aggressive 
Global Europe trade strategy. India, on 
the other side, has increasingly turned 
to export-driven growth, particularly in 
services, which it wants to sustain even 
though hundreds of millions of Indians 
have not benefited from that model. 
With the EU India‘s biggest trading part-
ner, the EU-FTA is particularly important 
for India‘s corporate sector.
The EU‘s corporate driven 
trade agenda
European industry has put forward a 
range of demands including the full liber-
alisation of trade in industrial goods; 
the elimination of almost all agricultural 
import tariffs; the dismantling of invest-
ment regulations in sectors such as bank-
ing, insurance, telecom, retail and postal 
services; the liberalisation of the trade in 
services including for highly speculative 
financial instruments; a ban on export 
restrictions to secure access to raw mater-
ials; the liberalisation of public procure-
ment markets; the ease of migration of 
key personnel; and the protection of intell-
ectual property rights beyond the req-
uirements stipulated by the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). The FTA, however, 
business says, should not be linked with 
social or environmental standards.
ExEcUTIvE sUmmary
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The EU Commission has assured EU 
industry that “we must decide together 
what we want, then work out how to get 
it”. It has established a plethora of chan-
nels for the close and exclusive consul-
tation of corporate interests. Before the 
launch of the negotiations, industry‘s 
wish-lists were collected in a detailed 
questionnaire and special contact per-
sons were put in place. In countless exclus-
ive meetings and email exchanges with 
the EU‘s negotiating team, business has 
been given sensitive information about 
the on-going talks and has been invited 
to provide details about problems they 
face in penetrating the Indian market. 
In Delhi, the EU delegation, the Euro-
pean Business Group in India and the 
Commission-sponsored European Busi-
ness and Technology Centre have acted 
as brokers for corporate interests and as 
information hubs for EU-negotiators.
Three corporate lobby battles – for the 
extension and tough enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, the disman-
tling of tariffs and for opening up the 
Indian retail market to giant European 
supermarkets – illustrate how big bus-
iness has used its relationship with the 
EU Commission to inscribe its interests 
into the EU negotiation agenda. The 
Commission has also activated corp-
orate lobby campaigns to back up its 
own corporate agenda.
India‘s corporate-driven 
trade agenda
Indian industry has demanded more 
access to the European services market; 
an EU-wide work permit and relaxed 
visa restrictions to make it easier for their 
employees to move around Europe; the 
elimination of 95% of the EU‘s tariffs; 
relaxed quality and health standards 
and the ability to challenge any future 
regulations that might hamper Indian 
exports to the EU. Internally, big bus-
iness has been campaigning to open 
up the Indian retail sector and parts of 
the corporate sector want to strengthen 
intellectual property rights in India. But 
India Inc. is opposed to radical tariff-cuts 
on its side and an FTA with labour and 
environmental standards attached to it.
Big business is being given privileged 
access to the FTA-negotiating agenda. 
Both, the Ministry of Commerce and the 
Prime Minister‘s office receive advice 
from bodies representing India‘s biggest 
companies. India‘s business organis-
ations the Confederation of Indian In-
dustry (CII) and the Federation of Indian 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
(FICCI) were the only non-government 
participants in the EU-India High Level 
Trade Group, the body which nailed 
down the broad parameters of the future 
FTA-negotiations in 2006. Subsequent 
consultations about the ongoing nego-
tiations also had a strong business bias.
Indian companies also target the EU at 
lobby lunches and dinners all over Delhi 
and through organisations such as the 
Europe India Chamber of Commerce 
and the Indian Embassy in Brussels. 
Corporate India is increasingly hiring 
professional lobby firms to influence the 
debate in the EU capital, for example, 
on the issue of easing labour migration. 
Lobbying is also happening at EU mem-
ber state level.
Behind closed doors, not listening 
to the people
The EU-India FTA negotiations are con-
ducted behind closed doors, with no 
negotiating text or position yet made 
available to the public. Requests for ac-
cess to meaningful information by Par-
liamentarians, state governments and 
civil society in India and Europe have 
repeatedly been turned down.
In the absence of transparency, labour 
unions, informal workers associations, 
anti-poverty, environmental, women, 
farmer and public health groups in India 
and the EU have called for an immediate 
halt to the negotiations until all informa-
tion is released and broad consultations 
including with the most affected groups 
in India and the EU have been held.
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Since 2007, India and the EU have been 
negotiating a far-ranging free trade 
agreement (FTA). It covers the liberalis-
ation of trade in goods, the deregulation 
of services, investment and government 
procurement, the strict enforcement of 
intellectual property rights and many 
other points. Various thorny issues 
remain to be resolved. But both parties 
want to conclude the negotiations in 
early 2011.
Despite this envisioned speedy show-
down, the public in both India and the 
EU know very little about the potential 
consequences of the free trade pact. 
Negotiations have been shrouded in 
secrecy, with no text or position as yet dis-
closed to the public, not even on request.
The little information that has been 
leaked, though, has given rise to serious 
concerns among trade unions, farmers‘ 
and women‘s movements, anti-poverty 
campaigners, public health and human 
rights organisations on both sides of the 
talks. They fear that the EU-India FTA will 
fuel poverty, inequality and environ-
mental destruction and have repeatedly 
called for an immediate halt to the nego-
tiations – until all information has been 
published and genuine public debates 
have taken place.
 1  InTrodUcTIon
Big business, on the other side, seems 
to be satisfied with the negotiations. 
And the coming pages will show why. 
In the EU, a powerful alliance of the EU 
Commission and corporate lobbyists 
using numerous channels and fora have 
forged a joint corporate negotiation 
agenda, which they pursue through the 
official trade talks, but also via other dip-
lomatic avenues. In India, where serious 
debate and research on corporate lobby-
ing are only just beginning, the govern-
ment is also teaming up with industry 
to develop its trade policy, deliberately 
leaving Parliament, state governments 
and civil society in the dark.
The result of this incestuous relationship 
between corporate interests and public 
authorities on both sides of the EU-India 
FTA-negotiations is an unsavoury big-
business-first agenda. It should worry 
anyone who is concerned about social 
or ecological justice or democracy. And 
it should provoke them to do everything 
possible to roll back corporate power 
over EU and Indian trade policies.
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India‘s liberalisation process began 
in the early 1990s when the country 
received a US$1.8 billion loan from the 
International Monetary Fund to tackle 
a dramatic debt crisis. The loan required 
radical ´structural adjustment‘, including 
deregulation, privatisation, the liberal-
isation of imports and the boosting of 
exports. The Rupee was significantly 
devalued and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) automatically allowed in many sec-
tors. The 1995 World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) agreements further opened the 
Indian market.
 
India‘s liberalisation offensive, however, 
did not mean that the government 
withdrew from the economy. It began 
to provide massive support for key in-
dustries such as information technol-
ogy (IT), business services, automotives, 
steel, telecommunications, chemicals, 
textiles and agri-foods1. The result was 
the spectacular growth of the Indian 
corporate sector and a massive expan-
sion of personal wealth for some. Today, 
seven Indian companies rank among the 
Fortune Global 500 list of corporate giants, 
including Reliance Industries (oil & gas), 
Tata Steel and five companies, which are 
majority-owned by the Indian govern-
ment2. Two Indians, Mukesh Ambani 
(Reliance) and Lakshmi Mittal (Arcelor-
Mittal), are among the five richest peo-
ple in the world3.
But hundreds of millions of Indians have 
been excluded from this corporate suc-
cess (see box 1). They bear the brunt of an 
increase in unemployment, a deepening 
of social inequality and a severe crisis in 
the agricultural sector, which accounts for 
60% of the country‘s households4. Nearly 
half of the 89 million farmer households 
in India are reported to be in debt5. Every 
30 minutes an Indian farmer commits sui-
cide, with an estimated total of 182,936 
farm suicides between 1997 and 20076.
India – country of contrasts
Photos: Eshm, Bharath Achuta Bhat, 
zz77 – all Flickr
As a result of this deep agricultural crisis, 
India has shown some reluctance to 
liberalise agricultural trade. The country 
is also cautious about further opening 
its industrial sectors. But with services 
accounting for ever larger shares of the 
GDP – 29% in the 1980s, 41% in the 90s 
and more than 57% today – India has 
become one of the most aggressive ad-
vocates of service trade liberalisation7. 
And the country wants to continue on 
the path of export-driven growth. By 
2014, India expects to double its exports 
of goods and services and by 2020 it 
wants to double its share of the world 
economy8.
Against the backdrop of uncertain 
progress in the WTO-negotiations, India 
has turned to bilateral and regional trade 
negotiations to pursue this agenda. It has 
recently signed free trade agreements 
with the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), Korea, Sri Lanka and 
Singapore. It is at different stages of FTA 
negotiations with the EU, the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA), Mercosur 
and Japan and is also eyeing up China, 
Australia and the US as potential nego-
tiation partners.
With the EU India‘s biggest trad-
ing partner, the EU-India FTA is par-
ticularly important. In 2008, 17% of 
India‘s imports came from the EU and 
21% of the country‘s exports were sold 
there. Yet, the country faces a yawning 
trade deficit of nearly €8,000 million (INR 
45,664 Crores9) with the EU10.
For the EU, India is only the 10th biggest 
trading partner. It is the destination of 
only 2.4% of the EU‘s exports and the 
origin of 1.9% of its imports11. But India‘s 
market of more than 1 billion people, its 
burgeoning middle class and its impress-
ive growth rates have whetted the app-
etite of European firms. Hence the huge 
 2  IndIa Inc. vs. GloBal EUropE – THE EU-IndIa 
frEE TradE aGrEEmEnT In conTExT
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importance that European industry and 
EU officials ascribe to the EU-India FTA.
 
The FTA is part of the EU‘s aggressive 
Global Europe trade strategy, a blueprint 
for enabling European multinational 
companies to penetrate every corner 
of the globe14. It was launched in 2006 
after enormous pressure from business 
groups to support EU businesses in 
competing globally. Nearly half of the 
world‘s 100 largest multinationals have 
their headquarters in the EU15. They are 
highly dependent upon export markets 
for their products and services and on 
the imports of inputs, particularly raw 
materials. And these companies are los-
ing ground as new players from emerg-
ing countries enter the global market16.
Global Europe‘s response to this chall-
enge is threefold: first, open new export 
markets for European industry, particu-
larly in Asia; second, protect industry‘s 
property rights abroad; and third, guar-
antee unhampered access to the world‘s 
“The poTenTial in india is 
absoluTely giganTic. We 
Talk abouT 1.2 billion inhab-
iTanTs, all of Them poTen-
Tial consumers of services. 
We jusT Think ThaT iT Would 
be a good idea To have a 
liTTle parT of ThaT cake.”
pascal kerneis, direcTor of The euro-
pean services forum12
“our domesTic markeT is 
shrinking so our boys have 
To go for asia, parTicularly 
india.”
germán lorenzo of spanish indusTry 
conglomeraTe mondragon aT an 
eu-india business meeTing, madrid, 
june 201013
“The eu-india fTa is hugely 
relevanT for us. i Would 
say iT‘s probably The mosT 
imporTanT fTa under nego-
TiaTion.”
adrian van den hoven, direcTor of 
inTernaTional relaTions deparTmenT, 
businesseurope 
raw materials. To that end, tariffs on EU 
exports have to be abolished and a wide 
range of domestic policies which stand 
in the way of European business are being 
challenged, including regulations or 
mere differences that make it harder to 
do business, investment rules, standards, 
intellectual property rules, subsidies and 
government procurement policies.
The EU has pursued this market opening 
agenda in the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) and in bilateral and regional FTA-
negotiations. Since the launch of the 
Global Europe strategy, the EU has con-
cluded far-reaching agreements with 
Korea, Colombia, Peru and the Central 
American region. Negotiations with Sin-
gapore, Canada, Mercosur, Ukraine and 
dozens of countries from Africa, the Car-
ibbean and the Pacific are ongoing. The 
deal with India, however, seems to be the 
number one priority. To quote Adrian van 
den Hoven, director of BusinessEurope‘s 
international relations department: “The 
EU-India FTA is hugely relevant for us. I 
would say it‘s probably the most impor-
tant FTA under negotiation.” 17
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Box 1: 
THE darkEr sIdE of sHIny IndIa
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
In Europe, India is often presented as an economic 
titan and the EU-India FTA is dubbed as an agree-
ment between equals. But the emerging Asian giant 
is not only home to skyrocketing economic growth 
rates and a burgeoning middle class.
India has the highest concentration of poor and hun-
gry people on the planet. Estimates of the propor-
tion of its people falling below the poverty line vary 
from about 40% (World Bank) to 77% (2007 report 
commissioned by the Indian government)18. Around 
35% of India‘s population and nearly half of its chil-
dren are undernourished19. More than 128 million 
people have no access to improved drinking-water 
sources and 665 million have no toilet20. More than 
20 million children of primary school age do not go 
to school and an estimated 12.6 million are engaged 
in child labour (out of a total of 210 million children 
aged 5-14 years)21.
India‘s per capita GDP stood at US$ 1,031 in 2009, 
ranking it 139 out of 180 countries – behind, for 
example, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Sudan, Bolivia, the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka and the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo22. On the Human Development Index, 
which measures people‘s well-being according to 
criteria such as life expectancy, literacy and living 
standards, India ranks 134 out of 182 and lies be-
hind countries such as Thailand, China, Honduras 
and Botswana. The country is doing particularly 
badly when it comes to life expectancy at birth and 
the probability of not surviving to the age of 40, at 
15.5%23. Only Bangladesh has a higher percentage 
of underweight children (47% instead of India‘s 
46%), with both countries almost twice as many as 
Sub-Saharan Africa24. In the Gender Related Devel-
opment Index (GDI) India takes a very poor position 
of 139 out of 155 countries25.
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“in The eu, economic inTer-
esTs have The benefiT 
of firsT-raTe access To 
decision-makers on Trade 
policy issues.”
andreas dür, professor of inTer-
naTional poliTics, universiTy of 
salzburg, ausTria32
“my job descripTion is 
´open neW markeTs for 
The euro-pean indusTry 
and The european services 
secTor‘.” 
eu Trade commissioner karel de 
guchT 33
In countless documents, policy initia-
tives, PR campaigns and speeches, the 
EU portrays itself as a leader in the fight 
to eradicate poverty and hunger, to pro-
vide decent work, access to medicines 
and environmental sustainability. It also 
constantly lauds itself as a champion of 
transparency and accountability. The EU 
Commission‘s trade department is at the 
frontline of this feel-good rhetoric.
The coming sections, however, will show 
that the reality of EU trade-policy making 
is different. The FTA-negotiations with 
India are shrouded in secrecy, prevent-
ing anything as irksome as democratic 
decision-making. The concerns of public 
interest groups are largely ignored. And 
a powerful alliance of corporate lobbyists 
and EU Commission are jointly driving a 
big-business-only agenda in the nego-
tiations – an agenda set to fuel poverty 
and inequality in India and elsewhere.
 3  THE EU‘s corporaTE-drIvEn TradE aGEnda
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Box 2: BIG BUsInEss aT THE HEarT 
of THE EU‘s TradE polIcy
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Since the 1950s, the EU has had a common trade 
policy, which means that it functions as a single 
actor in trade matters. The Brussels-based EU 
Commission negotiates EU trade agreements on 
behalf of the Union‘s 27 member states. It obtains 
a negotiating mandate from their governments, 
which also have to approve the final deal. Since 
the entry into force of the EU‘s Lisbon Treaty, the 
European Parliament has also to give its consent 
to new trade agreements. But the Commission 
remains in the driving seat of EU trade policy, 
which is why it is the main target of corporate 
lobbyists.
And Brussels is full of them. An estimated 15,000 
professional lobbyists roam the corridors of the 
EU capital, 70% representing big business. The 
city is home to more than 500 transnational corp-
oration offices, over 1,000 industry associations 
and nearly 300 “hired gun” consultancies that 
are ready to execute every well-paid commission 
to lobby. Many of their staff used to work in the 
EU institutions and know exactly who and how 
to lobby. And they have enormous resources at 
their disposal. In 2009, the European chemical 
industry lobby CEFIC, for example, spent more 
than €44 million (INR 251 Crores) on influencing 
the EU institutions, employing over 160 lobbyists 
in Brussels – on top of thousands of people doing 
the same job for chemical companies and their 
national associations26.
When it comes to trade policy, the EU Commission 
works hand in glove with corporate lobbyists. It 
has been shown to have developed its overall 
trade agenda, the Global Europe strategy, in 
close cooperation with the European employers‘ 
group BusinessEurope27. BusinessEurope and 
other industry groups are regularly invited to 
exclusive meetings, where they are given access 
to sensitive information about ongoing trade 
negotiations – information that is withheld from 
public interest groups. The Commission also pro-
vides business with a place in the EU‘s market ac-
cess teams, working in Brussels and on the ground 
in 30 countries outside the EU to identify and get 
rid off whatever regulation stands in the way of 
European exports.
The Commission also has a record of “reverse” or 
“top down lobbying”28. Its aim is to actively encour-
age the creation of business structures which sup-
port the Commission‘s own corporate agenda. In 
the late 1990s, then Trade Commissioner Leon 
Brittan invited the chairman of Barclays Bank to 
set up the European Services Forum (ESF), which 
has proved to be a driving force behind the EU‘s 
aggressive global push for liberalised services 
markets ever since. More recently, the Commis-
sion set up a bi-regional business forum – the 
Business Trade Forum EU-Southern Africa – to 
provide active support for its controversial EPA 
negotiations with countries from Africa, the Car-
ibbean and the Pacific. Together with Business-
Europe, the Commission also drafted the pro-EPA 
position of the EU-Africa Business Forum29.
On the other hand, it is hard to find evidence 
of the Commission responding positively to the 
concerns about trade issues voiced by social, 
development or environmental groups. A handful 
of them participate in the Commission‘s official 
consultation forum, the ´Civil Society Dialogue‘. 
There, however, the fundamental direction of the 
EU‘s trade agenda is not up for discussion30. And 
other, more informal channels of influence are 
less open to them. In 2009, DG Trade‘s Director 
General, David O’Sullivan, admitted that while his 
door was open to non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs), he had “indeed made efforts to have 
more contacts with business”. As a result, “indus-
try walks through that door more often than 
others,” he said and added: “I do not apologise for 
that, this is the way it‘s going to be.” 31
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questionnaire to key associations asking 
them to provide detailed information on 
problems they faced in exporting goods 
and services, setting up businesses, pur-
chasing raw materials etc37.
One month later, the then EU Agriculture 
Commissioner Mariann Fischer Boel led 
a delegation of 28 food and drink com-
panies from across the EU to India – to 
get a clear idea of their interests in the 
FTA-negotiations, among other things. 
Three days before official negotiations 
began, she told European agribusiness: 
“Business and politicians must link up 
more closely. It‘s politicians who do the 
negotiating about barriers to trade. But 
you must tell us where to negotiate. We 
don‘t want to spend time and energy 
opening up a market which no European 
company is interested in supplying. We 
must decide together what we want, 
then work out how to get it”38.
“business and poliTicians 
musT link up more closely. 
iT‘s poliTicians Who do The 
negoTiaTing abouT barriers 
3.1 corporate Europe‘s agenda 
and its pre-negotiation lobby 
offensive
The fact that the EU‘s Global Europe 
strategy named India as one of the 
future FTA partners was already the 
result of successful lobbying by big 
business. After the collapse of the WTO 
negotiations in Cancún in 2003, indus-
try groups such as the employers‘ fed-
eration BusinessEurope (then UNICE) 
convinced the EU Commission that the 
EU’s 1999 ‘moratorium‘ on new bilateral 
and region-to-region trade negotiations 
should come to an end. They also pres-
sured DG Trade into clearly stating that 
future FTAs would be pursued on the 
basis of purely economic criteria such 
as economic size and growth – and no 
longer according to political motivations 
as had been previously the case34. Finally, 
the Global Europe strategy also reflected 
demands from groups like BusinessEurope 
and the European Services Forum (ESF) to 
specifically list India and other “key emerg-
ing countries... not the whole world”35.
Smaller businesses though were not 
happy with this decision. UEAPME, the 
voice of small and medium sized enter-
prises (SMEs) in Europe, raised serious 
concerns. The organisation warned of 
the competitive challenges emerging 
markets created for SMEs and made 
clear that a focus on the EU’s bordering 
countries would have been more useful 
for them36. Nonetheless, the Commiss-
ion has launched FTA-negotiations with 
a whole range of non-border countries 
since the launch of the Global Europe 
strategy in 2006.
Months before the official launch of the 
talks with India at the end of June 2007, 
the Commission started consulting busi-
ness about their specific interests in 
the talks. In February, DG Trade sent a 
not on the agenda
People‘s movements and public inter-
est groups in the EU and India alike 
have criticised industry‘s EU-India FTA 
demands (see box 3) which they say will 
have potentially devastating impacts 
on the livelihoods of farmers, workers 
and other marginalised groups; increase 
India‘s vulnerability to financial crises; 
increase the pressure on the countries‘ 
natural resources; reduce public spend-
ing on education, health or food security
as a result of revenue losses; hamper 
To Trade. buT you musT Tell 
us Where To negoTiaTe. We 
don‘T WanT To spend Time 
and energy opening up a 
markeT Which no european 
company is inTeresTed in 
supplying. We musT decide 
TogeTher WhaT We WanT, 
Then Work ouT hoW To geT iT.”
former eu agriculTure commission-
er mariann fischer boel aT a meeTing 
WiTh eu agriculTural exporTers, 
brussels, 25 june 2007
Trade unions, on the other side, have 
repeatedly stressed the need for such 
a binding chapter in an FTA with India, 
a country where labour rights continue 
to be violated43. They have lobbied for 
a “strong and unambiguous” sustain-
able development chapter that pro-
vides for fines for breaches and which 
would be “subject to the same dispute 
settlement treatment as all other com-
ponents” of the FTA44. But the Commis-
sion seems to side with industry. While 
it initially considered an FTA-chapter on 
sustainable development “a ´formality‘ 
access to seeds and affordable medi-
cines; and lead to the loss of policy space 
when, for example, government pro-
curement policies can no longer be used 
to help small and local firms and margin-
alised constituencies39.
Their concerns – such as sustainable 
development and labour rights – did 
not make it onto the corporate agenda 
for the negotiations. Asked about what 
labour and environmental issues they 
faced in the trade with India, Business-
Europe replied “none” and added that 
it was satisfied with India‘s current leg-
islation40. The lobby group representing 
traders and retailers, EuroCommerce, 
bluntly stated that “trade policy should 
not be linked with social or environmen-
tal standards”41. In no case should the 
EU make concessions for an FTA-chapter 
that would bind India to certain environ-
mental standards, labour laws or human 
rights. And by no means should it be a 
deal breaker42.
Child labour in India is not an 
issue for European business
Photo: Siddy Lam, Flickr
necessary to appease the EU‘s Parliament45”, 
it is now working on “some sort of coopera-
tive language... not a sanctioned based 
approach” and has admitted that “the 
language is important to us, but it won‘t 
be a deal breaker46”. 
The start of something special
The FTA-questionnaire was only to “kick-
off a process of close consultations and 
information flows” between the Commis-
sion and industry as Director General David 
O’Sullivan explained to BusinessEurope 
(then UNICE) in February 2007. He assured 
its Director General, Philippe de Buck, that 
“my colleagues are discussing with your 
colleagues the most practical ways and 
means to get organised in this respect”48. 
A few weeks later, still two months before 
the launch of the negotiations, Business-
Europe was given the names of all chief 
EU FTA-negotiators. DG Trade and DG 
Enterprise also established special contact 
persons for industry input49.
It didn‘t take long for BusinessEurope to 
contact them. On 22 May 2007, four weeks 
before the official bargaining with India 
began, DG Trade‘s Lisa Mackie, Annette 
Grünberg and Frauke Sommer met with 
three BusinessEurope lobbyists to spec-
ifically discuss negotiation tactics: Carlos 
Gonzalez-Finat, an advisor at the time for 
BusinessEurope, Gisela Payeras from the 
European pharmaceutical lobby EFPIA and 
Robert Court, the then vice president of 
pharma giant GlaxoSmithKline and chair of 
BusinessEurope‘s India commission. They 
wanted to know what kind of business 
input the Commission would find most 
useful, “e.g. more noise from their side to 
push for launch of negotiations, more sub-
stantial input etc”. They also asked what 
negotiation documents the Commission 
would be able to share with them “to 
enable them to maintain the momentum 
vis-à-vis their members and counterparts 
in India”. Finally, BusinessEurope inquired 
how DG Trade planned to involve business 
associations both in the EU and India in the 
negotiations (see original email)50.
DG Trade deleted its responses from the 
internal meeting report, obtained by Corp-
orate Europe Observatory through access 
to information requests. They argued that 
the withheld information referred to neg-
otiating tactics, the disclosure of which 
would limit the Commission‘s margin for 
manoeuvre51. Instead, the disclosed parts 
suggest that releasing the full report would 
once more reveal how closely the Commis-
sion works with big business in EU trade 
policy-making (see original email).
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Box 3: corporaTE EUropE‘s corE 
dEmands for THE EU-IndIa fTa47
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Full liberalisation of trade in industrial goods: 
total elimination of import tariffs for all industrial 
goods within seven years and no possibility of exclud-
ing certain sensitive products from tariff cuts. Longer 
time frames for these cuts should only be possible for 
a very limited number of sensitive products.
Nearly full liberalisation of trade in agricultural 
products: elimination of agricultural import tariffs 
with only a few exceptions for sensitive products that 
might be exempt from liberalisation or liberalised to 
a lesser extent. Tariffs for processed food and bever-
ages, however, should be reduced to zero.
Dismantling all regulations on investments by 
EU companies in India: there should be no limits 
to foreign ownership for European banks, insurance 
and telecom companies. Sectors that are completely 
or relatively closed to foreign investors such as retail, 
accounting, legal and postal services should be 
opened up to European multinationals, the unlimited 
transfer of their profits guaranteed and limits on risky 
forms of investment eliminated. There should be pro-
tection for European investments, particularly against 
all forms of expropriation.
Liberalisation of trade in services: European com-
panies want a less regulated services market in fields 
such as research, insurance, banking, telecommu-
nications and maritime transport. This includes the 
liberalisation of risky and highly speculative financial 
instruments.
A ban on export taxes and other export restric-
tions: to secure unhampered access to manufac-
turing inputs for European industries, India should 
abstain from export restrictions on raw materials 
such as rice, cotton, leather, rare earth, paper, wood 
products and metals that the country has used stra-
tegically to encourage infant industries or for reasons 
of price stability.
The protection of intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) beyond what is required under WTO rules: 
this includes ´data exclusivity‘ for a minimum period 
of 10 years, to strengthen the monopoly rights of 
pharmaceutical and agrochemical companies. It also 
includes an army of IPR enforcement measures rang-
ing from at the border measures against potentially 
counterfeit goods to “cleaning up any street market 
that sells pirated European goods” (EuroCommerce).
An ambitious government procurement chapter: 
This would enable European companies to bid for public 
contracts in sectors such as energy infrastructure, water 
Original email from DG Trade
treatment, healthcare, transport or construction.
The elimination of regulatory (´non-tariff‘) bar-
riers (NTBs) that hamper market access for Euro-
pean exporters. This includes a demand for regula-
tory transparency, information on any proposed new 
regulation in India long before it is implemented and 
´consultation mechanisms‘ through which European 
corporate interests can provide comments and input.
The facilitation of the migration of key person-
nel for both industry and services subsidiaries: the 
mutual recognition of professional qualifications is key.
Strong and rapid dispute settlement mechanisms: 
this also includes so called investor-to-state provisions 
that would allow European companies to directly sue 
India at international tribunals when they feel that 
their investment or profits are being jeopardised.
Intense cooperation between business and the 
Commission: the Commission should “closely involve 
industry, keeping it regularly updated throughout the 
FTA negotiation process, from preliminary consulta-
tions and the launch of the talks through to the com-
pletion of the final agreement” (European Tyre and 
Rubber Manufacturers Association).
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are also full of remarks about industry‘s 
gratitude for the information.
The EU‘s market access teams and 
corporate trade diplomacy
Regular FTA-consultations are not the 
only place where the EU Commission 
and European industry align their efforts 
to pry open markets for EU exporters. 
Big business also has a lucrative place in 
the EU‘s market access working groups. 
Here, Commission officials, EU member 
state representatives and corporate lobby-
ists sit together to discuss regulations 
in key markets that stand in their way – 
and develop joint strategies to get rid of 
them. What business expects from these 
groups is clear: the Commission should 
“gather necessary information from 
companies”, “adapt to company perspec-
tive” and “speak company language”57.
India is high on the agenda in the groups 
dealing with postal and distribution 
services, cars, tyres, textiles, food safety 
and animal health measures. Many of 
the issues raised by industry have made 
it into the EU‘s list of top-10 priority bar-
riers to the Indian market58:
The EU has objected to Indian govern-
ment proposals for a bill for the Indian 
postal market that will limit foreign 
ownership in the sector to 49%, give 
the Indian Post exclusive competence 
for certain services and require large 
companies to contribute to India‘s 
universal service fund. The Indian 
 3.2  Institutionalising corporate 
influence over the negotiations
Ever since the launch of the negotiations 
with India, the doors of the Commission 
have been wide open to interested busi-
nesses. BusinessEurope, in particular, 
meets behind closed doors with high-
level officials from DG Trade at least once 
a month to discuss the talks52. Individual 
companies, national business federa-
tions and sectoral associations like the 
services lobby ESF, the car lobby ACEA 
and the pharmaceutical federation EFPIA 
have extra meetings to discuss specific 
aspects of the negotiations. Some of 
them also meet with the Commission‘s 
Department for Enterprise and Industry 
(DG ENTR) which is also involved in the 
negotiations.
According to the Commission, officials 
“test the state of play of the negotiations 
with relevant industry sectors53” in these 
meetings. This involves sharing “sensitive 
elements regarding industry positions 
and/or regarding the EU‘s negotiation 
position54”. The Commission also invites 
business to share its priorities and to 
give concrete examples of the barriers 
to market access they face “to assist the 
Commission in establishing priorities and 
taking decisions”55. Both sides are per-
fectly satisfied with these get-togethers 
as BusinessEurope‘s Philippe de Buck, 
and DG Trade‘s Director General David 
O‘Sullivan assured each other during 
lunch not long ago56. DG Trade‘s internal 
reports about these kinds of meetings 
government argues that these meas-
ures are necessary to ensure afford-
able and guaranteed services to all 
citizens because private couriers “are 
operating only in creamy areas and 
big business centres with the sole mo-
tive of profit without corresponding 
responsibility towards deprived class-
es of people residing in rural, remote, 
hilly, tribal and inaccessible areas of 
the country”59. The EU, however, finds 
these measures “too cumbersome” for 
European couriers like DHL and TNT. In 
the market access working group on 
postal services, they are represented 
by PostEurop, the Europe Express As-
sociation (EEA) and the ESF.
The EU has challenged India‘s import 
restrictions on pork and poultry prod-
ucts from countries affected by bird 
flu. On behalf of the Association of 
Poultry Processors and Traders (AVEC), the 
European food and drink lobby (CIAA) 
and the meat processors lobby group 
(CLITRAVI), the EU has challenged 
these restrictions, which it claims 
go beyond international standards. 
India, however, insists on its right to 
take preventive measures against the 
spread of the flu: “We are well within 
our rights to impose the restrictions 
as we have been affected by the bird 
flu virus in the past and don‘t want to 
take any risks”60.
The EU has challenged requirements 
for a certificate that shows that impor-
ted pork products come from places 
India Post or DHL – who will deliver mail to India‘s 
tribal people?
Photos: David, Gerard Stolk, both Flickr
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“We idenTify, in parTnership, 
The barriers ThaT maTTer 
mosT To eu business, and 
Work in parTnership To 
address Them, Through 
fTas, bilaTeral negoTia-
Tions, dialogues or Trade 
diplomacy.”
The former eu Trade commissioner 
caTherine ashTon aT a symposium 
on markeT access, paris, 
27 november 200864
“The markeT access Work-
ing groups are like a big 
ear-TrumpeT, WiTh Which 
The commission and The 
member sTaTes lisTen To 
businesses and gaTher Their 
markeT access inTeresTs.“
ralph kamphöner, eurocommerce, 
The lobby group for reTailers, 
Wholesalers and Traders65
that are free from a number of pig 
diseases. Again, the EU has acted on 
behalf of the meat industry and criti-
cised the measure for going beyond 
what is internationally required. 
The EU has challenged existing and 
upcoming legislation for medical 
technology that requires, for example, 
that any imported device still has a 
valid shelf life of not less than 60% of 
its original shelf life – an anathema for 
the lobby group for the medical tech-
nology industry Eucomed.
The EU has objected to certain qual-
ity and health standard conditions 
for imported hides and skins, which 
it claimed go beyond international 
standards and were hurting exports 
from the European leather industry.
The EU has challenged the need for an 
Indian certificate for imported tyres for 
consumer protection and road safety. 
The EU Commission, the European 
Tyre & Rubber Manufacturers‘ Associa-
tion (ETRMA) and tyre companies such 
as Continental, Michelin and Pirelli, 
which apply different safety stand-
Will this tyre shop soon sell 
only Continental, Michelin or 
Pirelli tyres? 
Photo: parul2999, Flickr
ards, see these kinds of regulations as 
“barriers to trade with a danger to spill 
over to the whole Asian region if they 
are not contained”61.  
Once these so called ´non-tariff barriers‘ 
have been identified, they are jointly 
challenged by the EU Commission in 
Brussels, its delegation in Delhi, mem-
ber states‘ embassies and industry. Their 
offensive takes place on all fronts: in the 
FTA talks, at the multilateral level in the 
WTO and in all kinds of ´dialogues‘ with 
the Indian authorities, sometimes with 
the support of other trading power-hubs 
like the US or Japan. As a result of this 
coordinated corporate trade diplomacy, 
India has already relaxed its import con-
ditions for some poultry and pork prod-
ucts and for hides and skins62. And the 
Commission is committed to continue 
“to work on all issues that member states 
and industry will bring to the table. The 
more pre-emptive actions are, the better 
the chances of success”63.
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“We can use The commission 
as our mouThpiece in The 
fTa.”
member of The council of The euro-
pean business group in india
EBG members include European multi-
nationals from the world of finance 
(HSBC, Deutsche Bank), oil and energy 
(Total, BP, Suez, Areva, Veolia), pharma-
ceuticals (GlaxoSmithKline), military 
and defence (EADS) and automobiles 
(Mercedes Benz).
According to the group‘s website, it 
“receives valuable support from the 
European Commission”. It even oper-
ated from the delegation‘s offices for 
a period in 2002 and 200371. And the 
chief of the economic and trade section 
of the EU delegation, Carlos Bermejo 
Acosta, is a member of the EBG‘s coun-
cil. No wonder, the EBG praises its rela-
tions with the Commission: “We can use 
the Commission as our mouthpiece, 
for example, in the FTA where we are 
regularly asked to share our experience 
and our ideas about how things should 
work... This is then picked up by EU-
negotiators in the talks with the Indi-
ans... The Commission also uses our 
position paper as a guide for what has 
to happen to facilitate trade and doing 
business in India. So we do indeed get a 
lot of support from the Commission and 
they are always willing to listen to us”72.
Another new strand in the complex 
web of EU industrial-political relations 
in Delhi is the European Business and 
Technology Centre (EBTC). It is run by 
the Association of European Chambers 
of Commerce and Industry, Euro-
chambres. But it was initiated by the 
Commission in the context of the Glo-
bal Europe strategy “to essentially pro-
mote the EU interests in India and tap the 
fast-growing Indian economy”73. The EU 
finances 80% of the costs for setting up 
the EBTC and regional offices all over In-
dia – with more than €11.5 million (INR 56 
Crores) from the EU‘s external aid fund74!
The EBTC‘s ostensible aim is the prom-
otion of European clean technologies 
in India‘s ´sunrise sectors‘ energy, envi-
ronment, transport and biotechnology 
(including controversial technologies 
for biofuels and ´clean‘ coal). But the 
EU tender already made it clear that the 
centre should also detect and challenge 
market access barriers in India.
3.3 Industry and the EU working 
hand-in-hand in delhi
When it comes to the EU-India FTA, the 
symbiosis between the Commission 
and big business does not end at the 
EU‘s borders. The Delhi based EU del-
egation to India, which plays an impor-
tant role in gathering and distributing 
information related to the negotiations, 
often acts as a broker for corporate 
interests – from both India and the EU.
When EU Trade Commissioner Karel 
de Gucht paid his first visit to India in 
March 2010, the delegation made sure 
he met the two big Indian industry fed-
erations, FICCI and CII – but he did not 
meet groups that are critical of the EU-
India market-opening pact such as the 
Forum Against FTAs. Industry apprec-
iated the meeting. A CII-lobbyist stated: 
“It‘s important to keep these kinds of 
communication channels open so that 
the Indian industry interests are always 
on the agenda”66. That conclusion is 
probably shared by the “select group of 
EU business leaders” who also had an 
informal meeting with de Gucht during 
his visit67.
The EU delegation also has close-knit 
ties to EU industry in India when there‘s 
no high-flyer coming in from Brussels. 
They told Corporate Europe Observ-
atory: “Whenever we need to get infor-
mation, clarifications, inform or be 
informed about developments in a par-
ticular sector we approach the specific 
organisation that can help us”68. This 
can be individual EU companies present 
in India, chambers of commerce or the 
European Business Group (EBG), which 
was founded by the EU delegation in 
the 90s to promote the interests of Euro-
pean businesses in India69.
When, for example, new legislation for 
medical devices in India came up in 
2008, the delegation set out to bring 
EU companies and member states 
together “to agree on a concerted way 
forward.” The EBG was asked to ensure 
the participation of all relevant EU 
firms70.
The Commission, which monitors the 
EBTC via its delegation, re-iterated that 
task when it felt it was not prominent 
enough on the centre‘s agenda. In 
October 2008, shortly after the EBTC 
opening, DG Trade‘s Annette Grünberg 
reminded Eurochambres‘ international 
affairs director that “tackling NTBs/mar-
ket access constraints should be one 
of the centre‘s key objectives” because 
they “fit in very well” with the Commis-
sion‘s “other ongoing activities, most 
notably the current negotiations for a 
free trade agreement.” She continued: 
“I would thus be very concerned if this 
objective would not receive the atten-
tion as foreseen in the guidelines and 
would be very grateful if you could 
confirm that tackling NTBs and other 
market access constraints is a key com-
ponent within the action plans you are 
currently developing... I would also be 
more than happy to discuss this further 
and provide you with some additional 
ideas of how the centre could take this 
objective forward”75. Just a few days 
later, Grünberg shared one of these ideas 
with the European pharmaceutical 
lobby EFPIA which she suggested 
should explore whether the EBTC “could 
facilitate business-to-business contact 
in the pharmaceutical sector” to discuss 
and challenge regulatory barriers in the 
sector76.
Eurochambres for its part has made no 
bones about the ETBC being a market-
opening tool that will promote Euro-
pean business interests and the EU‘s 
´economic diplomacy‘ in India. It cel-
ebrates the centre as “a successful 
agenda setting initiative” and plans the 
establishment of similar hubs in other 
key markets. “More economic diploma-
cy is needed to promote our common 
interests, to put the European flag in 
emerging markets,” it says77.
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“We are doing This for you.“
former eu Trade commissioner peTer 
mandelson To business communiTy 
abouT The launch of The fTa nego-
TiaTions, eu-india business summiT in 
helsinki, ocTober 200684
The EU-India business summit:  
influencing a lobby forum to lobby 
yourself
The European Commission has some-
thing of a track record of reverse lobbying 
whereby it actively orchestrates business 
support to back up its own corporate 
agenda (see box 2 on page 10). The yearly 
EU-India business summit is no exception. 
For a decade this forum has assembled up 
to 300 business people from India and the 
EU, usually on the day before the political 
summit. Officially, it is a business-driven 
process co-organised by industry from 
both sides. But internal reports show that 
the Commission is actively involved in the 
preparation, messaging and follow-up to 
the´business‘ event. 
In the run-up to the 2009 gathering in 
Delhi officials from the EU delegation 
and from its Brussels based trade, enter-
prise and external relations departments 
put forward their own ideas for key 
themes for the summit (“to have some-
thing concrete to present to CEOs to lure 
their interest”) and for its programme 
(“fewer subjects... including the EU pri-
orities”). They also suggested changes to 
the draft summit statement prepared by 
BusinessEurope and the Confederation 
of Swedish Enterprises, the business org-
anisation from the country then holding 
the EU Presidency78.
Protest at the EU delegation 
in Delhi in March 2009: 
we don‘t agree with these 
“agreements”
Former EU Trade Commissioner 
Peter Mandelson (centre) 
shaking hands with former 
Indian Minister for Commerce 
and Industry, Kamal Nath 
(right), former CII President 
and telecom tycoon Sunil 
Bharti Mittal (left) and 
BusinessEurope‘s Philippe 
de Buck (second left) at the 
EU-India Business Summit in 
Delhi, 29 November 2007
Commission officials also urged Euro-
pean industry to include a round-table 
for chief executives in the event – 
to enable intimate discussions between 
“8-10 top CEOs from both sides, including 
a high level interaction with Ministers/
Commissioners”79. Similar roundtables 
had taken place in 2006 and 2007 and 
had been praised by the Commission 
as a space for big business to “provide 
direct inputs to the trade negotiations” 
through “the privileged access that CEOs 
may gain to leaders”80. 
Industry was happy to oblige. During 
the summit, a roundtable allowed the 
chief executives from corporate giants 
like ArcelorMittal (steel) and Bharti (tele-
com, financial services, retail, processed 
food) to meet the Indian and Swed-
ish trade ministers and then EU Trade 
Commissioner Catherine Ashton and to 
discuss their agenda. BusinessEurope 
hoped that this would convince them “to 
advance cooperation between India and 
the EU more rapidly, if we make them 
aware of the strong business backing”81. 
This seems to have worked out. A Euro-
pean businessman who participated in 
the business conclave described it as a 
“turning point” in the talks, which he 
said had lost steam until then. After the 
summit, “leaders on both sides seemed 
to rediscover their enthusiasm”82.
Nonetheless, the Commission appears 
unsatisfied with the business summits‘ 
progress and seems to look for ways 
to tighten its grip on the event. It had 
previously complained about the “too 
weak and slow preparation” and the lack 
of a joint statement from both business 
communities. It warned industry “that 
we cannot go on with Business Summits 
as usual” and that “there is little value 
in having a one-off high profile event 
unless there is appropriate follow up to 
discussions or key recommendations”. 
A “talk-shop” had to be avoided. The 
Commission‘s external relations depart-
ment (DG Relex) therefore suggested 
closely involving the EBTC, which is co-
financed and monitored by the Comm-
ission, in the preparation and follow up 
to the summits83.
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“The indian governmenT 
Will be Trading aWay our 
lives by agreeing To The eu‘s 
demands on inTellecTual 
properTy and enforcemenT 
in fTa negoTiaTions. and iT 
is noT only our lives ThaT 
are aT sTake buT Those of 
millions around The 
developing World in asia, 
africa and laTin america 
ThaT rely on india as a 
source of affordable 
generic medicines.”
loon gangTe, delhi neTWork of hiv/
aids posiTive people (dnp+)87
These arguments are countered by what 
the European Parliament once described 
as one of the most effective lobby actors 
at the European level88: the European 
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries 
and Associations (EFPIA). EFPIA was be-
hind the EU‘s data exclusivity rules, which 
provide the longest protection period 
in the world (effectively 10+1 years). 
Academic research has shown that the 
lobby group‘s interests prevailed over 
those of the generics industry, patients 
and EU member states with shorter or 
no protection periods because EFPIA 
captured all phases of the regulatory 
process through a “clientilistic” relation-
ship with DG Enterprise89. Until recently, 
DG Enterprise was responsible for phar-
maceutical policy in the EU.
3.4  The downsides of the 
corporate agenda: select lobby 
battles 
3.4.1 Industry‘s attempts to 
close down the pharmacy of 
the developing world
Access-to-medicine campaigners have 
repeatedly warned that the EU-India FTA 
could drastically restrict access to medi-
cines in India and the world. They have 
targeted three elements of the leaked 
EU negotiating position on intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) that go beyond 
the requirements of the WTO‘s TRIPS 
agreement on IPRs85:
data exclusivity provisions, whereby 
Indian generic drug-makers would be 
obliged to repeat the innovator comp-
anies‘ costly and time consuming tests 
because public authorities could no 
longer rely on their test data to approve 
the generic drug. This could delay or 
even prevent the registration of and 
price competition through generics;
an extension of the standard life of 
patents from 20 to up to 25 years;
enforcement measures including 
provisions allowing the seizure of 
products suspected of infringing IPRs 
at the Indian border, which could 
hamper legitimate trade in generics;
Public health groups and centre-left Eu-
ropean Parliamentarians have argued 
that these provisions would enable Big 
Pharma to maintain prohibitively high 
prices on medicines and drastically re-
strict India‘s ability to produce and ex-
port cheap generic versions of drugs. The 
country‘s existing policy against the abu-
sive patenting of medicines has fostered 
a blossoming generics industry that not 
only supplies the whole of India with af-
fordable drugs for the treatment of AIDS, 
malaria, cancer, tuberculosis and the 
swine flu, but is also their largest supplier 
throughout the developing world. Ninety 
per cent of HIV/AIDS patients in the glo-
bal South currently depend on generics 
from India. But the EU-India FTA seems to 
threaten the country‘s pivotal role as the 
´pharmacy of the developing world‘86.
EFPIA has also used its good contacts 
with DG Enterprise to try to influence 
IPR legislation in India. The lobby group 
has made numerous inputs90 to India‘s 
pharmaceutical policy to DG Enterprise‘s 
Thomas Heynisch, who is an ex-lobbyist 
for the German association of research 
based pharmaceutical manufacturers 
vfa91. The vfa represents two thirds of the 
German pharmaceutical market, includ-
ing corporations like Bayer, Glaxo-Smith-
Kline, Merck, Novartis, Pfizer, Roche and 
Sanofi-Aventis. As a consequence, DG 
Enterprise has tabled the issue of data 
protection in each of the meetings of the 
working group on pharmaceuticals and 
biotechnology that was established in 
the context of EU-India economic policy 
dialogue in 200692.
But, EFPIA‘s lobby activities on the EU-
India FTA are mainly shrouded in sec-
recy. There is no position paper avail-
able and the organisation is not willing 
to respond to questions on the issue. 
Correspondence and Commission 
reports about meetings with EFPIA and 
individual pharmaceutical companies 
like Sanofi-Aventis or Glaxo Smith-Kline 
requested under the EU‘s access to information 
law are either undisclosed or heavily 
censored. The Commission claims that 
they contain insights about “negotiation 
priorities being pursued by the industry”, 
the release of which could undermine its 
commercial interests and the EU‘s posi-
tions in the negotiations93. Does this 
mean that the EU just copies Big Phar-
ma‘s negotiation priorities? How else 
could their public disclosure undermine 
the EU position?
EFPIA is not alone in lobbying for strict 
IPRs in the EU-India FTA. Their data exclu-
sivity mantra is repeated by national 
business associations like the American 
Chamber of Commerce (AmCham EU), 
the German group BDI or the French 
body MEDEF and by the pesticides lobby 
ECPA (European Crop Protection Asso-
ciation). ECPA represents pesticide and 
seed giants like BASF, Bayer CropScience, 
Dow AgroScience, Dupont, Monsanto 
and Syngenta. Together with CropLife 
India, they have lobbied against India‘s 
Cartoon: Polyp, www.polyp.org.uk, 
www.speechlessthebook.org
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“The eu’s ipr demands Will 
end farmers‘ fundamenTal 
righTs To save and 
exchange seeds and add To 
The loss of planT varieTies 
and valuable TradiTional 
agriculTural knoWledge. 
buT india’s precious agro-
diversiTy developed over 
Thousands of years is 
crucial To our food, 
ecology and exisTence.”
indian coordinaTing commiTTee of 
farmers movemenTs in a leTTer To 
prime minisTer singh, april 2010 96
“developing counTries and 
leasT developed counTries 
should noT inTroduce 
Trips-plus sTandards in 
Their naTional laWs. 
developed counTries 
should noT encourage 
developing counTries... To 
enTer inTo Trips-plus free 
Trade agreemenTs and 
should be mindful of 
acTions Which may infringe 
upon The righT To healTh.”
anand grover, un special 
rapporTeur on The righT To healTh, 
31 march 200998
2008 Pesticides Management Bill, which 
has yet to be approved by the Indian Parl-
iament. The bill accepted the concept 
of data exclusivity for agrochemicals, 
but only provides a protection period 
of three years for the related test data94. 
ECPA has also continued to raise the issue in 
the context of the trade negotiations95.
Stricter enforcement of IPRs and more 
public money to combat product and 
brand piracy also rank high on the corp-
orate agenda for the EU-India FTA. To 
combat the “serious crime” of counter-
feiting in India, big business proposes 
the establishment of IPR-enforcement 
cells in police headquarters, training for 
police and judges and the “cleaning up 
of any street market that sells pirated 
European goods” (EuroCommerce). Busi-
ness also advocates ´border protection 
measures‘ and the respective training 
of customs officials to prevent products 
alleged of infringing IPRs to be impor-
ted, exported or even transported 
through the Indian market97. In the EU, 
such tough rules have led to a number 
of seizures of shipments of Indian-made 
generic medicines en route to Africa and 
Latin America, which have been con-
demned by public health groups across 
the world and the World Health Organ-
isation (WHO). In May 2010, India and 
Brazil launched a WTO dispute about 
the drug detentions, which they claim 
violate WTO rules and the principle of 
universal access to medicines.
AIDS activists protest against 
EU-India FTA, Delhi, March 
2010
Photo: www.msfaccess.org
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“WhaT We Would like is as 
much markeT opening as 
possible in india.”
adrian van den hoven, business-
europe108 
The EU could rely on big business sup-
port for this tariff-slashing-agenda. Its 
manufacturers had made it clear that 
they wanted all Indian import tariffs dis-
mantled – not just 90%. This was repeated 
over and over by the European employ-
ers‘ federation BusinessEurope – prob-
ably the most powerful lobby group in 
EU trade policy-making – and influential 
national associations such as the Ger-
man group BDI, the French body MEDEF, 
the Belgian FEB and AmCham EU. Sec-
toral manufacturing lobby groups like 
ACEA (automobiles), CEFIC (chemicals), 
Euratex (textiles), CEPI (paper) Eurofer 
(iron and steel) and Eurometaux (metals) 
also joined the campaign for zero tariffs 
in India102.
Once India started its internal consulta-
tions about possible sensitive products, 
the Commission called this corporate 
lobby battalion into action. In February 
2008, DG Trade‘s Frauke Sommer alerted 
BusinessEurope that the Indian Minis-
try of Commerce and Industry had just 
posted a ´negative‘ list of 643 sensitive 
products on its website. She warned that 
“such products could require a different 
treatment, ie. could be exempted from a 
tariff elimination within 7 years”103.
Business Europe knew what to do. The 
following month, the day before the 
then Trade Commissioner Peter Mandel-
son met with the then Indian Minister of 
Commerce and Industry Kamal Nath, the 
lobby group wrote to Mandelson. It de-
manded that “an agreement with India 
must include as close to 100% coverage 
as is possible for industrial goods tariffs” 
and that a limited amount of sensitive 
products “must also be liberalised but 
could be allowed slightly longer transi-
tion periods.” The letter continued: “The 
list released recently by the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry is far too ext-
ensive and includes a large number of 
products of important export interests 
for European companies. It would also 
exclude whole sectors from tariff liber-
alisation. BusinessEurope cannot accept 
such a list as India‘s tariff offer.” Mandel-
son thanked the lobby group for the 
“timely reinforcement” of his position 
and assured BusinessEurope that their 
3.4.2  slashing industrial and 
agricultural tariffs to zero
In the context of trade liberalisation, 
farmers, fisherfolk, trade unions, women‘s 
organisations and other public interest 
groups have repeatedly warned of the 
detrimental impacts of massive tariff reduc-
tions on vulnerable sectors of society. 
Three issues have mainly been raised: 
the negative effects of cheap imports on 
small-scale farmers, fisherfolk, small enter-
prises and workers who are out-com-
peted in the rat race with multinationals 
and driven into poverty; the potential 
reduction of social spending resulting 
from diminished tariff revenues, which 
still form a sizeable part of government 
budgets in the South; and, the loss of 
policy space for national development 
strategies, which have been widely pur-
sued by rich countries in the past.
As a result of tariffs cuts in the EU-India 
FTA, the EU‘s own impact assess-
ments predict a “significant production 
decrease” and job losses in India‘s auto-
mobile and auto components sector due 
to increased imports from the EU. They 
also predict layoffs in the paper and 
electronics industries and a long term 
decline in agricultural employment99. 
The European Parliament has likewise 
warned of “the potential disadvantages 
of the FTA and the ways in which human 
development and gender equality may 
be adversely affected by the rapid open-
ing of markets”100.
Despite these concerns, EU and Indian of-
ficials already agreed before the launch 
of the FTA-negotiations that they will cut 
at least 90% of all tariffs on both sides to 
zero within seven years101. Yet, nego-
tiators differed in what would happen 
to the remaining 10%. India wanted an 
asymmetrical deal, where the EU alone 
would reduce an additional 5% of its 
tariffs, reflecting the vast gap in wealth 
between the two parties. The EU, how-
ever, insisted on equal tariff eliminations 
and pressured India into limiting its list 
of sensitive products, which it wanted to 
exempt from cuts.
interests “coincide with my own priority 
concerns and were discussed extensive-
ly”. In a hand-written note, he suggest-
ed a get together between European 
and Indian industry groups to pave the 
ground for a compromise104.
Ever since BusinessEurope has signalled 
to Indian industry that the tariff issue was 
a red line for them. In their statement for 
the EU-India business summit in 2009, 
for example, they stressed that “it is not 
possible to conclude an agreement that 
totally excludes any industrial goods 
from liberalisation” because “there will 
simply not be a constituency in Europe 
to support the deal”105. This was again 
echoed by national and sectoral assoc-
iations which increased the pressure on 
the Commission by stressing that they 
would never support a deal with a ´neg-
ative‘ list that excluded manufacturing 
sectors from total tariff dismantling106. 
To quote Erik Bergelin from the car lobby 
ACEA: “No! No negative list! Point... If we 
have that, we are going to be against the 
agreement”107.
But this kind of muscle flexing should 
not be taken literally. After a two-year 
fierce lobby campaign for a symme-
trical tariff deal, European business 
knows that India will most likely not 
buckle. But keeping up the pressure is 
crucial to pry open as many key manu-
facturing sectors as possible. Chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, textiles and clothing, 
automobiles and auto parts, electron-
ics, machineries and precious metals 
rank particularly high on the corporate 
agenda. For these sectors, tariffs, they 
say, should be completely scrapped on 
both sides109.
Similar demands are made by the agri-
business sector. The EU‘s top five agri-
cultural export products – beverages 
including wines and spirits, cereal prod-
ucts, fruits and vegetables, dairy and 
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“opening up agriculTure 
markeTs for europe Where 
agriculTure is dominaTed by 
large agribusiness, suffer-
ing from over-producTion 
and exporTs are heavily 
subsidized Will have a 
devasTaTing effecT on 
india’s self sufficiency in 
food producTion and on 
farmers and farm Workers.”
s. kannaiyan from The farmers‘ 
associaTion Tamizhaga vivasayigal 
sangam in Tamil nadu115
Paper factory in India: will it 
survive the competition with 
the Europeans?
Photo: Dave Morris, Flickr, http://cargocol-
lective.com/Davemorris/
Will this milk farmer be able 
to survive subsidised milk 
imports from the EU?
Photo: World Bank, Flickr
meat products – face tariffs of between 
20 and 70% in India. The maximum 
duties that the country could impose are 
even higher (65-127%)110. CIAA, the Con-
federation of EU Food and Drink indus-
tries which lobbies for companies like 
Unilever, Coca Cola, Danone, Kraft Foods 
or Nestlé, wants to see these duties dis-
mantled on a reciprocal basis111. And 
it is backed by sectoral associations in-
cluding Freshfel (fruits and vegetables), 
Caobisco (chocolate, biscuits and sweets), 
the Danish meat association, the Euro-
pean Dairy Association (EDA) and the EU 
dairy trade association (Eucolait)112.
The corporate tariff cutting agenda has 
been demonstrably translated into EU 
demands for zero duty on chemicals and 
textiles113. According to media reports, 
the Commission is also pressuring India 
to open its automotive, wines and spirits 
and dairy sectors. NGO calls for far less 
radical and encompassing cuts to pro-
tect the livelihoods of India‘s poor and 
to leave India important policy space for 
national development strategies have 
seemingly been ignored. This could have 
particularly serious livelihood impli-
cations for the 75 million woman and 15 
million men working in the Indian dairy 
sector, including many who are landless. 
They fear that competition from subsi-
dised EU imports will serve as the final 
nail in their coffin114.
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“carrefour, The World’s 
second largesT reTailer, 
is  opening Their firsT 
Wholesale ouTleT in india 
in a very loW income 
localiTy of delhi WiTh 
Thousands of sTreeT 
vendors around. 
These supersTores are 
coming here To Wipe us 
ouT compleTely.”
hakim singh raWaT, general secreTary, 
delhi haWkers Welfare associaTion 
and a member of sTaTe vending 
commiTTee118
“Tesco Will rely on emerging 
markeTs for iTs fuTure 
groWTh and india is very 
much in our radar.”
mike mcnamara, Tesco121
“india is decisive for us. 
When We ask our members 
abouT Their prioriTy
 counTries, india is alWays 
menTioned as one of The 
firsT... iT is one of The mosT 
imporTanT fTas for us.”
andreas berger, eurocommerce, 
The eu lobby group of reTailers, 
Wholesalers and Traders122
Yet, the European retail lobby insists on 
opening up the Indian market. They want 
full liberalisation commitments and in 
particular the right to open multi-brand 
retail stores119. In plain terms: no owner-
ship limits to Tesco, Carrefour, Metro & 
Co.; no limitations on the number, size 
and location of their markets; no local 
sourcing requirements and no limita-
tions on the purchase and sale of certain 
products; no regulation of prices and 
opening hours; and no more favour-
able terms for domestic small-scale local 
shops or wholesalers. Economic needs 
tests, which could be used to assess 
economic and social impacts prior to 
granting a retailer a licence, would also 
no longer be an option. Yet, in many 
European countries including France, 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Italy, Malta and Portugal 
these kinds of assessments of, for exam-
ple, the impact on existing stores, traffic 
conditions and new employment are 
a precondition for the authorisation of 
new stores. They play a significant role 
in protecting independent shops and 
small producers120.
3.4.3  European supermarkets 
hijack the Indian retail market
Large supermarket chains such as Metro 
(Germany), Carrefour (France), Tesco 
(UK) and Ahold (Netherlands) have by 
and large saturated the European mar-
ket. Now they are looking elsewhere. 
With its vast population, projections of 
continued economic growth and rela-
tive absence of big stores from its retail 
landscape, India is one of their prior-
ity destinations. The country has been 
crowned the hottest market for global 
retailers several times116.
But the Indian retail market is still rela-
tively well protected. Foreign companies 
may open 100% owned cash-and-carry 
wholesale markets. Metro already has 
cash-and-carry stores in four Indian cit-
ies, Carrefour ist opening its first one in 
Delhi and Tesco will follow with a store 
in Mumbai at the end of 2010. But for-
eign retailers can only own up to 51% of 
stores which sell only one brand such as 
Nike or adidas. And foreign investment in 
multi-brand retail is prohibited outright. 
As a result, more than 90% of India‘s retail 
sales are still made from small neigh-
bourhood shops and street vendors, 
estimated to employ between 30 and 40 
million people117. They are vehemently 
opposed to large corporate-style retail-
ers and to liberalising the sector, which 
they fear will destroy their livelihoods.
Big retail is well equipped to make its lib-
eralisation agenda the EU position. Two 
European trade associations represent 
their interests in Brussels: the Foreign 
Trade Association (FTA) and EuroCom-
merce. The European Retail Roundtable 
(ERRT), which brings together a dozen 
chief executives from Carrefour, H&M, 
Woman Street Vendor 
in Mumbai
Ikea, Metro, Tesco and others, is also 
based in Brussels “to promote active 
retail engagement” in EU policies and 
“provide a bridge of communication” 
to top European policy makers123. Their 
demands are echoed by lobbyists from 
individual companies, national trading 
associations, BusinessEurope and by 
the influential European Services Forum 
(ESF). Textile companies and their lobby 
group Euratex also advocate European 
investments in Indian retail and have 
“expressed the interest to coordinate 
with the retail industry (EuroCommerce) 
to help the Commission in the negotia-
tions with India”124.
The Commission liaises closely with this 
swarm of lobbyists. In an internal assess-
ment of its 2009 activities, EuroCom-
merce, for example, praised its “close 
contact with the EU negotiators” and its 
“well-established constructive working 
relationship with DG Trade” in the con-
text of the market access working group 
on distribution services125. Commission 
officials and EU member states sit along-
side EuroCommerce, the ESF and the 
ERRT to identify the main trade barriers 
Protests against the opening 
of a Metro store in Bangalore 
in 2007
in key markets and to set up strategies 
for “fast solutions”. These include “per-
suasion and pressure” on developing 
countries, monitoring new legislation 
“to prevent problems before drafted 
measures become effective” and “diplo-
matic actions” by EU member states and 
the EU delegation in Delhi126.
A foretaste of such “diplomatic actions” 
was given by the German Consul-
General in Kolkata, Gunter Wehrmann, 
in 2008. Amidst street traders‘ protests 
against the opening of a Metro Cash & 
Carry store in Kolkata and the refusal of 
the city‘s marketing board to allow the 
company to purchase and sell agricul-
tural produce, he threatened the state 
government: “If Metro Cash & Carry does 
not get the required licence, this will be 
the death knell for any future German 
investment here in the eastern region. 
Metro is a household name in Germany 
and if they are unable to set up a store 
here, then other companies will also follow 
suit and prefer going elsewhere”127. The 
Chief Minister of West Bengal buckled 
and granted the necessary licence, by-
passing the marketing board.
In future, political interventions like this 
might no longer be necessary. EuroCom-
merce is “convinced that the FTA will 
further open up the Indian retail market 
as distribution services is high on the 
agenda of the negotiation teams”128. The 
Commission, for its part, has “confirmed 
that the distribution sector is one of the 
priority areas in the ongoing FTA nego-
tiations” and has already communicated 
its interests to India, despite the EU’s 
awareness of the sensitivities of the 
Indian retail sector129.
Demands by Indian civil society, 
Members of the Parliament and some 
state governments to limit the super-
market expansion and defend the in-
terests of smaller retailers, which have 
been repeated by European develop-
ment groups including ActionAid, 
Traidcraft and Oxfam, have seemingly 
been ignored130.
3.5 Behind closed doors, not 
listening to the people
Anti-poverty, environment, women and 
public health groups in Europe have 
raised fundamental concerns about the 
EU‘s Global Europe strategy and the EU-
India FTA in particular. They fear that the 
agreement will have a damaging effect 
on industries, jobs and livelihoods, 
access to services and medicines and 
will deprive India of important policy 
tools to foster development and serve 
its people. They have also criticised the 
lack of transparency, public debate and 
the absence of accountable democratic 
processes surrounding the FTA-talks, 
with no negotiating text or position yet 
disclosed for public scrutiny131. Even in-
formation about negotiating positions 
and tactics that has clearly been shared 
with corporate lobbyists is withheld 
from public interests groups132.
Civil society groups in Europe have 
called for an immediate halt to the neg-
otiations until:
all negotiating texts and positions are 
made public
comprehensive impact assessments 
and meaningful, broad consultations 
with the most affected groups in 
Europe and India have taken place
the EU‘s approach to the negotiations 
has fundamentally changed. Devel-
opment concerns, human and labour 
rights, food sovereignty, environmen-
tal, social and gender justice should 
inform the EU position – not commer-
cial interests133.
Table 1 (page 26) shows that the EU 
Commission does not care about these 
demands – despite DG Trade‘s constant 
feel-good rhetoric about accountability, 
transparency and addressing civil society 
concerns in EU trade policy.
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European trade activists pro-
test against the EU corporate 
trade agenda in front of DG 
Trade‘s headquarters in 
Brussels, March 2010
“We are glad To see ThaT 
We share The same goals 
as The commission on The 
subsTance of The negoTia-
Tions.”
american chamber of commerce To 
The eu afTer an in-depTh discussion 
of The eu-india fTa WiTh commission 
officials in april 2009134
“european and indian civil 
socieTy represenTaTives 
agree ThaT almosT all 
aspecTs of The negoTia-
Tions Will have a damaging 
effecT on The livelihoods 
of india’s poor Women and 
men.”
barbara spechT from The Women‘s 
neTWork Wide135
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Issue
IPR
Tariffs
Services and
Investment
data exclusivity provisions that “protect” test 
date of authorised drugs and chemicals for a 
minimum of 10 years
strict enforcement measures: police IPR-cells, 
training for police, customs and judges, border 
protection measures to prevent products 
alleged of infringing IPRs to be imported, 
exported and transported through the Indian 
market
Elimination of all import tariffs on industrial 
products without the possibility of excluding 
certain sensitive products
Focus on zero tariffs for chemicals, textiles, 
automotives and auto parts, electronics, 
precious metals, machinery
Elimination of tariffs for agricultural products 
with a few exceptions for sensitive products
Focus on zero tariffs for processes food and 
beverages, meat, dairy, cereals, fruits and 
vegetables
Dismantling of regulations that are in the 
way of EU companies: no limits on foreign 
ownership for European banks and insurance 
companies; open up closed sectors like retail, 
accounting, legal and postal services; unlimited 
transfer of profits of European subsidiaries; no 
limits on risky forms of investment
Broad protection for European investments in 
India particularly against expropriation; far-
reaching obligations for India
Investor-to-state provisions that allow compa-
nies to directly sue India through international 
tribunals
Go beyond TRIPS standards: “This chapter shall 
complement and further specify the rights and 
obligations between the Parties beyond those 
under the TRIPS Agreement” (art. 8.1)
introduction of data exclusivity in India (art. 18)
extent patents from the standard 20 to up to 25 
years (art. 17.3)
border protection provisions that allow the 
seizure of products suspected of infringing IPRs 
at the Indian border (art. 36)
training of personnel for the enforcement of 
IPRs (art. 38)136
Elimination of more than 90% of tariffs on 
manufactured and agricultural products within 
7 years; aiming at tariff liberalisation for all 
industrial products
Zero tariffs on chemicals, textiles and probably 
also dairy, automotives, processed food and 
beverages
Less radical liberalisation commitments for a 
limited list of sensitive agricultural products
“far reaching liberalisation of services and invest-
ment139”
emphasis on the following sectors: banking, 
insurance, retail, accounting, legal and postal 
services...
full liberalisation of capital movements
no limits on risky forms of investment
Maximum protection for EU investors
Investor-to-state provisions that allow companies 
to directly sue India through international 
tribunals
European Parliament resolution: “restrict the 
Commission‘s mandate so as to prevent it from 
negotiating pharmaceutical-related TRIPS-
plus provisions affecting public health and 
access to medicines, such as data exclusivity, 
patent extensions... within… future bilateral 
and regional agreements with developing 
countries137”
provisions on data exclusivity, patent extension 
and border measures/ enforcement should be 
excluded from agreement
European Parliament stressed “right of govern-
ments to maintain necessary policy space and 
regulatory capacities to shape economic and 
social policies that serve their most vulnerable 
people, including trade measures to protect 
weak economic actors”138.
Preserve tariffs to generate revenue for social 
spending and protect vulnerable sectors of 
society
Cutting 90% or more of all tariffs goes too 
far; up to 60% of agricultural duties must be 
treated as sensitive
Need for deep impact assessments with focus 
on livelihood protection
Governments need maximum flexibility to limit 
and regulate foreign investment and services to 
minimise costs and maximise benefits for their 
societies and in particular vulnerable groups
Focus should not be on investment protection, 
but on fostering positive investor behaviour and 
promoting long-term sustainable investment
Obligations not just for state receiving invest-
ment, but also for companies and their home 
states (e.g. relating to social, environmental + 
labour standards and development)
No international investor-to-state dispute 
settlement140
EU negotiation position positions of public interest groups 
and parliamentarians
requests from EU industry
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
TaBlE 1: WHosE InTErEsT coUnTs for THE EU commIssIon?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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Issue
Government 
procurement
Access to raw 
materials
Open Indian market to enable European 
companies to bid for public contracts in sectors 
such as energy infrastructure, water treatment, 
healthcare, transport or construction
EU companies should be treated like domestic 
and other foreign companies (non-discrimina-
tion + national treatment)
ban export taxes and other export restrictions 
on raw materials to secure European industry 
unhampered access to manufacturing inputs
“progressive liberalisation of procurement 
markets at national, regional, and, where 
appropriate, local levels; as well as in the field 
of public utilities”
“gradual market access on the basis of the 
principles of non-discrimination and national 
treatment”141
prohibit export taxes and other export 
restrictions
Governments must be allowed to favour par-
ticular suppliers in their procurement policies to 
boost domestic production and support small 
enterprises, marginalised constituencies and 
poorer regions
no ban on export restrictions
respect the right of countries to regulate their 
exports of raw materials
recognise communities‘ right over natural 
resources and stop forced displacement of 
people from their habitats and sources of the 
livelihood
 
EU negotiation position positions of public interest groups 
and parliamentarians
requests from EU industry
Source: Own compilation
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Street vendors protest for 
livelihood security and 
against the EU-India FTA, 
Delhi, June 2010
“WashingTon-sTyle 
pracTices of corporaTe 
lobbying have crepT up on 
neW delhi poliTics, sub-
verTing The policy-making 
process To meeT The profiT 
imperaTives of privaTe 
corporaTions. The neW 
Trend of corporaTe 
lobbying in india presenTs 
a real and serious ThreaT 
To democracy.”
praful bidWai, journalisT and 
former ediTor of The Times of india148
“yeh sarkar Wo sarkar-TaTa 
birla ki sarkar – WheTher iT 
is The sTaTe or The cenTral 
governmenT, boTh are run 
by TaTa-birla.“
popular saying in india
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Box 4: IndIan TradE polIcy and 
THE BUsInEss-polITIcs nExUs
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
In India, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry 
(MOCI) is responsible for conducting trade negotia-
tions. It is neither mandatory nor common practice 
to consult other key ministries or departments such 
as labour, environment, social justice etc. Neither 
state governments nor the national Parliament 
have to be consulted; nor is the Parliament involved 
in the ratification process of international trade 
treaties. But the MOCI always makes sure it gets the 
Prime Minister‘s support.
Both, the MOCI and the Prime Minister get trade 
and investment advice from corporate bodies. 
In the case of the Prime Minister‘s office it is the 
Council on Trade and Industry, “created for part-
nership between Government and business” in the 
late 1990s142. It was re-vitalised in 2010 and brings 
together industrial and banking tycoons including 
Rata Tata (chief executive of the Tata group), Keshub 
Mahindra (chairman of the Mahindra conglomer-
ate), Mukesh Ambani (leader of India‘s largest priv-
ate company Reliance), telecom mogul Sunil Mittal 
and the leader of India‘s second largest bank ICICI, 
Chanda Kochhar143.
The MOCI is advised by the Board of Trade. It brings
together government officials, the presidents 
of India‘s biggest industry associations CII (Con-
federation of Indian Industry), FICCI (Federation of 
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry) and 
ASSOCHAM (the Associated Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry of India) and the chief executives of 
large corporations like Apollo Tyres, Dr. Reddy’s 
Laboratories (pharmaceuticals), WIPRO (IT), Mahindra 
(automotives, financial services, IT etc.), ITC (tobacco) 
and the Darjeeling Tea Association144. Trade unions, 
NGOs and social movements are not represented.
 4  IndIa‘s corporaTE-drIvEn TradE aGEnda
Sometimes, the MOCI organises public consulta-
tions about ongoing trade negotiations. But they 
are dominated by business federations like FICCI and 
CII and have a very limited focus. Larger issues like 
the impact of trade polices on livelihoods, health or 
the environment are not addressed and many of the 
crucial stakeholders and critical civil society groups 
are absent. In other cases, FICCI and CII carry out 
consultations on behalf of the MOCI, with an even 
larger business bias. Positions that have been put 
forward in these ´open‘ consultations are not public 
and are not even made available on request.
But big business influence on Indian trade policy 
does not end with these consultations. Washington-
style corporate lobbying practices are on the rise in 
India, with lobbying luncheons happening all over 
Delhi and the revolving-door between corporations 
and government institutions swinging cease-
lessly145. Popular sayings like Yeh sarkar wo sarkar-
Tata Birla ki sarkar (Whether it is the state or the 
central government, both are run by Tata-Birla) re-
flect the general belief that businessmen have too 
much access to power, ´influence‘ their way to per-
sonal wealth at the country‘s expense and should 
actually be prevented from having such access146. 
More recently, a lobby scandal involving India‘s 
telecom minister has led to opposition attacks on 
Manmohan Singh government‘s “most unhealthy 
nexus between big business and politics”. The gov-
ernment seems to agree that opening up of the 
economy and the fast pace of growth has created 
too much space for lobbyists and has promised to 
address the issue147.
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Big business‘ undue influence on the 
Indian negotiating position continued 
after the official launch of the EU-India 
talks in June 2007. Shortly after the 
launch, the government organised a 
series of consultations with business 
associations including FICCI, CII and 
ASSOCHAM to address two questions: 
how can Indian industry best be pro-
tected against European competitors 
through a list of sensitive products? And 
what products should by no means be 
listed as sensitive by the EU because of 
India‘s own export interests154? Without 
that feedback from business, MOCI‘s 
Rajgopal Sharma explained: “market 
access for our exports in the world mar-
ket cannot be realised up to their true 
potential”155. Larger issues about the 
FTA‘s impacts on livelihoods, health or 
the environment, however, did not make 
it onto the agenda of the ´open´ consul-
tations. And many of those who were 
most likely to be adversely affected by 
the trade pact were by-passed.
Big business appreciated the govern-
ment‘s invitation to mobilise against 
tariff cuts for its products. SIAM, the car 
producers‘ lobby group, for example, 
stressed that “no concession should be 
given to the EU and we will oppose any 
reduction of duties on automobiles”. It 
was backed by ACMA, the influential 
auto component lobby. According to 
SIAM, these lobby efforts paid off156. 
“cii is alWays involved in 
The fTa Talks from The very 
beginning aT a very high 
level. and ThaT happens 
auTomaTically. iT is noW 
almosT normal for The 
governmenT To call upon 
us aT The very early sTage.“
priTam banerjee, head of cii‘s Trade 
and inTernaTional policy division153 
“fish species such as 
mackerels, sardines, 
mulleTs, anchovies and 
flounders, The means of 
livelihood for TradiTional 
fishWorkers Will be 
imporTed under minimum 
Tariffs. We Will be denied a 
jusT price for our caTch as 
imporT of subsidised fish 
Would cause local prices 
To plummeT.“
T. peTer, kerala independenT 
fishWorkers federaTion162
4.1 corporate India‘s grip 
on the Indian negotiating 
position
Long before the EU-India FTA talks began, 
Indian industry was given the oppor-
tunity to insert its interests in the official 
negotiation agenda. The big business 
organisations CII and FICCI were the only 
non-government participants in the EU-
India High Level Trade Group (HLTG), 
which was set up in 2005 to nail down 
the broad parameters of the future FTA-
negotiations.
The group‘s 2006 report contains far-
ranging liberalisation ´recommend-
ations‘, several of which were clearly 
penned by industry. In its FTA position 
paper, CII, for example, advocated tar-
iff cuts for “90% of traded goods”149. 
This was repeated by the HLTG, which 
approved the elimination of 90% of all 
tariffs in the EU and India within a per-
iod of only seven years. The group also 
recommended substantial services 
liberalisation, improved market access 
for foreign investors, the free repatria-
tion of their profits, talks about liberalis-
ing government procurement markets 
and the protection and enforcement 
of IPRs150. With up to a quarter of the 
seats on the Indian HLTG delegation, 
CII and FICCI were well positioned to 
put these issues across151. No wonder, 
they considered their involvement “very 
important”152.
India proposed dozens of automobile 
and engine product lines as part of its 
list of sensitive products to the EU157. At 
the same time, it challenged the EU‘s list 
and pushed for the elimination of 95% 
of European tariffs – and not just 90% 
as suggested by the HLTG158. No wonder, 
European corporate lobbyists see key 
Indian industries as “absolutely very much 
supported by the Indian negotiators”159.
fisherfolk left out to dry
Indian trade unions, farmers‘, human 
rights and women‘s groups, in contrast, 
had long warned that far more than 
the envisioned 10% of products would 
have to be excluded from tariff cuts to 
protect food security and livelihoods in 
India. They also criticised the trade-offs 
between different economic sectors and 
India‘s offensive and defensive interests 
as “extremely problematic” from a public 
policy perspective160. For example, the 
number of fish products on India‘s list of 
sensitive products was narrowed down 
to just a few categories because India‘s 
export interests were considered more 
important than those of India‘s fisher-
folk161. Millions of people employed in 
the sector now fear that cheap imported 
fish will destroy their livelihoods and un-
dermine food security.
Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan 
Singh addresses the India-EU 
Business Summit in Paris, 
September 2008
Photo: Prime Minister’s Office
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The overlap between industry‘s wish-
lists and the position of the Indian 
government in the FTA-talks goes 
beyond the issue of tariff cuts. The 
Indian government‘s focus on services 
liberalisation likewise reflects its indus-
try‘s interest in providing more services 
to Europeans, for example, through call-
centres and online medical transcriptions 
in India or through subsidiaries in the EU. 
Indian services companies also want to 
make it easier for their professionals to 
work within and freely move across the 
EU – through mutual recognition agree-
ments for qualifications, relaxed visa 
policies and a Schengen-like EU-wide 
work permit163. European trade un-
ions have criticised this agenda for the 
unregulated temporary migration of 
employees, as working “to the detri-
ment of workers and communities both 
in the countries of origin and of desti-
nation”. They see trade negotiations as 
the wrong place for decisions about this 
kind of labour mobility164.
So-called non-tariff barriers are another 
corporate-driven focal point for the Indian 
negotiators. In 2009, FICCI carried out a 
survey about the market barriers faced 
by Indian companies when doing busi-
ness in the EU. Agricultural subsidies, 
quality standards and tests for fresh and 
processed fruits as well as lack of clarity 
on the EU‘s chemical regulation REACH 
were among the major issues raised165. 
They were picked up by the govern-
ment immediately, which, according to a 
report by the European Parliament on 
the negotiations is mainly concerned 
about “the lack of harmonisation of mi-
cro-biological standards in the EU, impli-
cations of REACH, costly certificates for 
exporting fruit to the EU and costly con-
formity procedures for the EC market”166. 
Like its European counterpart, Indian in-
dustry also wants to be able to challenge 
any new EU procedure or law that might 
hamper its exports and wants to place 
“the onus of explaining the need for the 
new procedure or law... on the partner 
who is introducing the law”167.
This export-and-get-rid-of-the-standards 
-in-your-way agenda creates a 
number of problems. First, many of the 
envisioned export products like fruits 
and vegetables are important for In-
dia‘s food security. Second, the export 
gains hardly ever trickle down to the 
small-scale farmers growing them 
who are in dire need of stable incomes. 
Third, the corporate pressure on ex-
isting and envisioned standards and 
regulations could lead to a significant 
regulatory chill in both India and the EU 
– to the detriment of consumers, public 
health, workers and the environment.
Last but not least, the Indian government 
has abstained from negotiating on the 
issues Indian industries do not want to 
include. They have several times made 
clear that they “will not be very confident 
with an agreement which has very strin-
gent labour and environmental stand-
ards attached to it”168. FICCI even claimed 
that the export of textiles and clothing to 
the EU has already become more difficult 
for Indian exporters because of various 
certification requirements related to the 
environment, health and labour issues169. 
Consequently, the Indian government 
has rejected outright the EU‘s wish to 
negotiate an FTA-chapter on sustainable 
development, which it claims lies outside 
the scope of a trade agreement170. 
“We Work very closely 
WiTh our oWn minisTry of 
commerce and indusTry… 
To make sure ThaT indian 
indusTry inTeresTs are kepT 
in mind Whenever Trade 
policy is being formulaTed 
or Whenever Trade nego-
TiaTions are going on.“
priTam banerjee, head of cii‘s Trade 
and inTernaTional policy division 171
4.2  Ipr and retail – a joint EU-
India big business agenda?
On other contested issues in the FTA-
negotiations it is not yet clear what posi-
tion the Indian government will eventu-
ally take. The opening up of the Indian 
retail sector is one example. Faced with a 
joint offensive from the EU Commission 
and EU businesses to liberalise the sec-
tor, the Indian government has until now 
Fisherfolk in the Indian state 
of Kerala
Photo: François Chabrerie, www.franchab-
photographe.fr
“We are lobbying like mad.“
former briTish high commissioner in 
india, michael arThur, on Tesco‘s 
efforTs To enTer The indian markeT178
“gianT reTailers like meTro, 
Tesco, carrefour and Wal-
marT are gaining ground in 
india WiTh alarming speed. 
They conTrol supply chains 
and desTroy exisTing reTail 
sTrucTures. producers 
and consumers Will be The 
ulTimaTe losers if This con-
Tinues.“
vijay prakash jain, general secreTary, 
bharTiya udyog vyapar mandal, an 
all india federaTion of small busi-
nesses and indusTries180
maintained a low profile on the issue. But 
it is also under high pressure from Indian 
corporate retailers like Bharti or Reliance 
which, for years, have been campaigning 
for relaxed FDI rules in the field.
At the 2009 EU-India business summit 
Bharti‘s man in charge, Sunil Mittal, told 
the attendant corporate-political elite that 
there was a need to open Indian retail, 
even though one had to be careful in doing 
this “in order to avoid unrest”172. This de-
mand is echoed by the big business assoc-
iations CII – which used to be chaired by 
Mittal – and FICCI, currently led by his 
younger brother and Bharti vice chairman 
Rajan. The latter has said that opening up 
the retail sector is top of his agenda as 
FICCI president173. It is no coincidence that 
in May 2010, the Prime Minister‘s main ad-
vis-ory body on trade issues, the Council 
on Trade and Industry, spoke out in favour 
of opening the Indian multi-brand retail 
sector to foreign investors174. Sunil Mittal 
and Mukesh Ambani from Reliance are 
both members of the body. 
Their campaign is echoed by other glo-
bal retailers who roam the India‘s corri-
dors of power. “It is impossible to swing a 
cricket bat in India without hitting teams 
of foreign retailers and consultants like 
Wal-Mart, Carrefour, McKinsey and AT 
Kearney who are studying the retail 
opportunity,” an investment group rep-
orted back in 2006175. There have been 
reports about the UK government “lob-
bying like mad” for UK multinational 
Tesco176. The world‘s biggest company, 
Wal-Mart, has spent millions of dollars 
lobbying the US and the Indian govern-
ment to enter the Indian retail market. 
And the money seems to have been well 
spent. In February 2010, the chief execu-
tive of Bharti Wal-Mart said that he was 
optimistic that the Indian government 
would allow FDI in the retail sector177.
This would not only threaten the liveli-
hoods of millions of street vendors and 
small shop owners (see chapter 3.4.3). It 
Street vendor in Mumbai
Indian store of the German 
wholesaler Metro
Photo: Metro
would also go against the Indian Parlia-
ment‘s advice for a blanket ban on for-
eign investment in retail from June 2009. 
At the time, a Parliamentary Committee 
argued: “Opening up of FDI in Retail Trade 
by allowing single Branch foreign firms in 
India will result in unemployment due to 
slide-down of indigenous retail traders. 
Consumers’ welfare would be side-lined, 
as the big retail giants, by adopting a 
predatory pricing policy, would fix lower 
price initially, tempting the consumers. 
After wiping out the competition from 
local retailers, they would be in a mono-
polistic position and would be able to dic-
tate the retail prices. Local manufactures, 
in particular the small scale industrial sec-
tor, would be gradually wiped out. The 
entry of few big organised companies, 
may result in distortions in the economy 
and the gap between ‘haves and have 
nots’ in the country”179.
Intellectual property rights provoke 
hot debate 
The Indian government is also under fire 
from parts of its corporate elite over the 
controversial issue of intellectual prop-
erty rights (IPRs). India has blocked the 
enhancement of IPR enforcement stand-
ards in various multilateral fora and res-
isted pressure to integrate a TRIPS-plus 
enforcement at home. This has been 
supported by many of its domestic com-
panies. But some powerful industry lob-
bies are pushing a TRIPS-plus agenda.
The CII, for example, has sided with the 
global pharmaceutical companies by 
supporting data exclusivity for five years. 
During that time, authorities would not 
be able to rely on existing test data for 
a medicine to register an equivalent 
cheaper generic version, which would 
increase the price of medication and 
could hamper India‘s generics industry. 
CII has also set up a special IPR enforce-
ment initiative to introduce radical 
enforcement measures in India and 
create a global partnership to combat 
counterfeiting. As part of that initiative, 
the lobby group sponsored a series of 
conferences, packed with judges, law-
yers, business leaders and government 
officials that were intended to forge 
the necessary alliances to really enforce 
patent law. These events have attracted 
heavy criticism from researchers, health, 
consumer and human rights groups, 
which have accused CII – and the Indian 
government, which partly co-sponsored 
the events – of siding with the very multi-
nationals and governments that lobby 
vigorously against patent rejections by 
the Indian authorities, public interest 
provisions in India‘s patent legislation 
and for an internationally contested 
TRIPS-plus enforcement agenda in the 
country. This, they claim, is neither in the 
interest of Indian people, nor in that of 
Indian industry, particularly SMEs181.
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“labour mobiliTy needs To 
be anchored in any agree-
menT as a righT for Workers, 
noT designed To serve The 
inTeresTs of employers.“
european federaTion of public serv-
ice unions186
4.3  promoting corporate 
India‘s interests into the EU 
institutions
Ever since the launch of the EU-India 
FTA negotiations, corporate India has 
increased its lobbying of the EU institu-
tions and governments. There have been 
numerous lunch and dinner meetings all 
over Delhi in recent years, where repre-
sentatives from FICCI and CII could be 
heard putting forward their interests to 
key visiting figures from the EU and its 
member states – from the different EU 
Trade Commissioners via members of 
the European Parliament to the German 
President and the Greek Prime Minister. 
The EU delegation and member states‘ 
embassies are key in organising these 
intimate gatherings and passing on 
information about corporate India‘s 
interests182.
In Europe, the lobbying approach used 
by CII, FICCI & Co. is also increasingly com-
plex. It includes regular events organ-
ised by the Europe India Chamber of 
Commerce (EICC) in Brussels, many of 
them with high-level participation from 
EU Commissioners and Parliament-
arians183. Large government-industry 
delegation visits to key EU member 
states have been organised. And there 
have been more and more targeted lob-
by meetings between Indian captains 
of industry and top EU negotiators. The 
Indian embassy in Brussels seems to play 
an increasing role in facilitating these 
contacts184.
Corporate India has also started hiring 
professional lobby firms in Brussels to 
push their interests inside the EU insti-
tutions via full-fledged lobby campaigns. 
The National Association of Software 
Companies (NASSCOM), for example, has 
hired PR multinational Hill and Knowlton 
to influence the EU-debate on the politi-
cally sensitive issue of labour migration 
linked to services trade. While EU mem-
ber states consider this a migration issue 
that they don‘t want to assign to trade 
negotiators, trade unions fear that 
deregulating the temporary movement 
The Indian IT lobby – a lobby giant in the Brussels bubble? 
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of workers might worsen their conditions 
and increase the downward pressure on 
labour standards across Europe185.
NASSCOM, however, wants to move its 
highly skilled non-EU staff across the EU 
– without having to apply for a new work 
visa in every member state and without 
having to deal with national regul-
ations such as minimum salaries. It has 
proposed a more flexible, EU-wide work 
permit and has tried to convince EU decision-
makers that so-called intra-company 
transferees (ICT) are a separate, specific 
group of workers that “do not form part 
of the labour market of the Member 
State or Member States to which they 
are temporarily transferred”187.
NASSCOM used Hill and Knowlton‘s lob-
bying expertise and dense web of Brussels 
contacts to feed this message into the 
EU policy-process. The person working 
on the file was a former trainee in the 
European Commission’s Secretariat-
General, so knew the Commission from 
the inside. She helped draft position 
papers and briefing notes, reached out to 
the media, assisted in forming coalitions 
and directly lobbied EU decision-mak-
ers, explaining “the reality that the utilis-
ation of highly-skilled temporary work-
ers will save companies money and help 
to kick-start the European economy”188. 
NASSCOM‘s president, Som Mittal, even 
secured two exclusive meetings about 
the EU-India FTA with DG Trade‘s Direc-
tor General David O‘Sullivan189.
The lobby strategy seems to have been 
successful. In an exclusive evening event 
that brought together ambassadors and 
high level diplomats from the EU mem-
ber states to the Embassy of India in 
Brussels at the beginning of May 2010, 
it was acknowledged that the EU‘s pro-
posal on ICTs would ease the temporary 
migration of high-skilled migrants to 
the EU190. And while participants also 
acknowledged the continuing sensitivi-
ties around the issue in Europe, NASS-
COM seems to be prepared to take on 
that challenge. “When the time comes, 
we will meet with ambassadors and pol-
iticians in various EU countries,” a confi-
dent NASSCOM president Mittal told the 
media191.
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“We are deeply concerned 
ThaT an fTa WiTh The eu 
in The backdrop of iTs 
corporaTe driven global 
europe sTraTegy Will have 
adverse socio-economic 
and environmenTal 
impacTs.“
forum on fTas, march 2009197
“We absoluTely oppose The 
signing of This fTa as iT Will 
have seriously deTrimenTal 
effecTs on rural liveli-
hoods, india’s agriculTural 
producTion and conse-
quenTly The food securiTy 
and naTional sovereignTy 
of india iTself.“
indian coordinaTing commiTTee of 
farmers movemenTs in a leTTer To 
prime minisTer shri manmohan singh, 
april 2010198
4.4  Behind closed doors, not 
listening to the people
It is a paradox that the ´ two largest democ-
racies in the world  ´are locked in FTA neg-
otiations behind closed doors, which will 
impact upon on all aspects of people’s lives. 
Until today, no negotiation text or position 
has been made available to the Indian pub-
lic, the Parliament or state governments 
for public scrutiny. Whenever Parliamen-
tarians or members of state governments 
have questioned the Indian government 
on the content of the FTA, they have been 
deflected with superficial information or 
received nothing at all192. Impact studies 
about the EU-India FTA, which have been 
commissioned by the government, have 
also been kept out of the public domain193. 
Similarly information about the ´open´ 
consultations on the FTA and about the 
positions that have been put forward by 
the stakeholders has not been made avail-
able. Respective access-to-information re-
quests have been refused194.
In the absence of transparency, labour 
unions, civil society organisations, rep-
resentatives of the informal sector, 
dalit and adivasi groups, fishermen and 
women, farmers‘ and women‘s networks 
have had little chance to understand the 
implications of the negotiations or to fight 
for their interests. In 2008, some 75 of 
them formed the Forum against FTAs195 to 
jointly analyse the critical issues involved 
in India‘s FTA negotiations and campaign 
against their disastrous impacts. The 
forum has called for the immediate stop to 
all FTA negotiations until:
all information on the FTAs is re-
leased, including government com-
missioned studies, negotiation texts 
and positions
there are broad public consultations, 
including with key constituents such 
as trade unions, farmers, women, 
dalit, adivasi and other peoples organ-
isations, SMEs, cooperatives, street 
vendors and state governments
a white paper on India‘s FTA strategy 
and its socio-economic and ecological 
impacts has been debated in Parliament
procedures for mandatory Parliamen-
tary and State Legislatures‘ approval 
of all FTAs are in place196.
These demands have been ignored by 
the Indian government and the Minis-
ter of Commerce and Industry has not 
found the time to listen to these dissent-
ing voices. Protest against the EU-India 
FTA, Delhi, March 2010
•
•
•
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“in The Wake of The global 
financial crisis, a serious 
reThinking on opening 
financial services musT 
Take place. The crisis has 
de-legiTimised The ´besT 
pracTices´ of european 
banks and calls for an 
expansion of The domesTic 
regulaTory space noT iTs 
resTricTion as The eu is 
demanding.”
indian bank experT kaWaljiT singh201
The little that has been leaked from or 
reported so far about the ongoing nego-
tiations between the EU and India raises 
a number of concerns about the FTA‘s 
impacts. The following sections outline 
some of the main criticisms that have 
been raised by farmers, trade unionists, 
women‘s organisations, public health 
and other civil society groups.
Undaunted by the ongoing financial crisis, 
the EU-India FTA aims to further liberalise 
and deregulate financial services in both 
India and the EU. The EU is likely to demand 
the opening of the Indian market for risky 
financial products and the removal of 
certain regulations that limit the foreign 
ownership or size of a bank. This could 
not only further destabilise the financial 
system, but also reduce access to bank-
ing services in rural areas, for the poor and 
for agricultural production. Unlike their 
domestic counterparts, foreign banks are 
not required to open bank offices in rural 
areas nor to provide agricultural loans nor 
to lend to people below the poverty line. 
Under the FTA, European banks would 
most likely continue to focus on “class 
banking” instead of “mass banking”199. 
According to the EU‘s own FTA impact as-
sessment, this could increase the pressure 
on domestic banks to also “concentrate 
more on profitable segment of urban and 
semi-urban markets”200.
 5  THE HUman consEqUEncEs of THE fTa
On the whole, India is likely to lose from 
the FTA‘s envisioned tariff reductions. 
The country‘s average tariff level (noti-
fied to the WTO) is 50.2%, compared to 
5.4% in the EU202. This means India will 
have to reduce its tariffs far more than 
the EU and will face a major loss of tax 
revenue. The abolition of protective 
tariffs might trigger surges of cheap 
imports from the EU, with negative 
impacts on employment and working 
conditions. This is particularly worrying 
for the 92% of India‘s 457 million work-
force who are in the informal sector, with 
no job security and little income203. The 
fisheries sector, for example, a powerful 
income and employment generator for 
a large section of economically marginal 
population in the country, might suffer 
from the import of cheap EU fish prod-
ucts204. The consequences for the agri-
cultural sector seem equally disturbing 
as Indian farmers will be forced to com-
pete with EU products such as dairy and 
dairy products, poultry, coffee, tea, sug-
ar, cereals, fruits and vegetables, some of 
them heavily subsidised205. Temporary 
quantitative restrictions on harmful im-
port surges as currently proposed in the 
2009 Foreign Trade (Development and 
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Popular perception of the 
corporate takeover of the 
Indian retail market is 
reflected in this cartoon
Regulation) Amendment Bill would no 
longer be an option.
The EU, on the other side, seems to 
have accepted that, in general, trade 
liberalisation can lead to “massive job 
losses” due to “economic relocation to 
third countries, a substantial increase in 
imports, or a rapid decline of the EU 
market share in a given sector”. To com-
pensate workers in regions and sectors 
“which have been disadvantaged by 
exposure to the globalised economy”, 
the EU has even set up the €500 mil-
lion (INR 2,854 Crores) strong European 
One of India‘s tribes, the 
Dongria Kondh, blockades 
the road to the site of a pro-
posed bauxit mine of British 
Vedanta in the Niyamgiri 
hills in Orissa, east India
Photo: Survival International, www.
survivalinternational.org
Globalisation Adjustment Fund206. The 
block‘s own impact assessment on the 
proposed FTA with India predicts job 
losses in the EU‘s automobile and cloth-
ing sector, affecting particularly female 
and migrant workers207.
The liberalisation of foreign investment 
could have far-ranging impacts on the 
livelihoods of millions of India‘s eco-
nomically disadvantaged. If, for example, 
EU-investors are granted unrestricted 
access to Indian land , this could lead to 
a dramatic change in the patterns of land 
use. More plantations could turn into real 
estate, subsistence land agriculture into 
corporate-owned farms and farms into 
factories – to the detriment of those who 
are already denied access to land, like 
women and dalits208. Liberalising FDI in 
the natural resource and mining sectors 
could likewise exacerbate ongoing strug-
gles against the land and water grabbing 
of extractive companies and subsequent 
displacement of thousands of tribal peo-
ple in the central and eastern parts of 
India209. India‘s fisherfolks also fear that 
large investors in the fisheries sector will 
endanger their livelihoods because of the 
potential overuse of marine resources 
and depletion of fish. Finally, opening up 
the retail sector to European supermarket 
chains could threaten the livelihoods of 
millions of street vendors and small shop 
owners. Several studies have shown that 
they are adversely affected by the market 
entry of corporate retailers. Street ven-
dors, in particular women, Muslims and 
those selling fruits and vegetables, name 
the competition with Big Retail as the 
number one reason for declines in their 
income210.
The EU-India FTA might also include 
clauses for investment protection and 
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investor-to-state dispute settlement 
mechanisms. This would grant corpora-
tions the right to directly challenge the 
Indian government and the EU at inter-
national tribunals in case of a loss of pre-
dicted profits. Across the world, business 
has used these provisions to gain dizzy-
ing sums in compensation for regulatory 
measures that diminished the value of 
their investments. Resource-rich coun-
tries have been sued for denying mining 
permits on environmental and public 
health grounds and for taxing extrac-
tive industries to increase the benefits 
for their own people211. In the EU, energy 
giant Vattenfall is currently seeking €1.4 
billion (INR 7,991 Crores) as compensa-
tion from the German government for 
environmental restrictions imposed on 
a coal-fired power plant in the city of 
Hamburg212. And in the infamous arbi-
tration about the Dabhol power plant, 
US multinationals Bechtel and General 
Electric successfully claimed millions 
of dollars from India and the State of 
Maharashtra213. The EU-India FTA could 
trigger lawsuits with similar dramatic 
economic impact and could prevent 
the EU and India from regulations in the 
public interest because there might be a 
dispute as a result.
Through the FTA, the EU also aims to ban 
India’s export restrictions on raw mater-
ials to secure reliable and undistorted 
access to cheap manufacturing inputs 
for European industry. India is among 
the world‘s largest producers of miner-
als like chromium, rare earth, graphite 
and barite214. The country has regularly 
limited the export of raw materials like 
rice, cotton, leather, iron ore and iron 
products to raise government revenue 
during commodity booms, encourage 
value-added sectors, protect natural 
resources or for reasons of price stabil-
ity and food security215. Denying India 
the right to restrict its exports, would 
deprive the country of important policy 
“iT is hard To accepT ThaT 
any inTernaTional agree-
menT should prevenT 
governmenTs from 
invesTing public resources 
in job creaTion, communiTy 
economic developmenT 
and economic reneWal 
Through iTs purchasing 
policies.”
european federaTion of public 
service unions (epsu)221
space and could fortify the impoverish-
ing trade pattern between India and the 
EU, according to which India exports raw 
products to the EU and imports proc-
essed, value-added products216.
Various groups in India and Europe have 
raised serious concerns over the EU’s 
demands for TRIPS-plus intellectual 
property rights protection in the FTA. 
They say that the EU demand to protect 
plant varieties according to the 1991 ver-
sion of the Convention on the Protection 
of Plant Varieties (UPOV), and not the 
1978 edition as is currently the case in 
India, would undermine the right of 
farmers to save, use, exchange and sell 
IPR protected seeds217. Public health 
groups have criticised the EU’s demands 
for data exclusivity, patent term exten-
sions and tough IPR enforcement meas-
ures for limiting India’s ability to provide 
access to affordable medicines in India 
and the rest of the world as a result of 
price increases. They argue that the EU‘s 
proposals could hamper and even pre-
vent the market entry of and trade in 
cheaper, generic medicines, which play 
a crucial role in bringing down the prices 
of live-saving medicines for the treat-
ment of AIDS, malaria, cancer, tubercu-
losis and other diseases218.
Liberalising government procurement, 
the purchase of goods and services by 
governments, is another priority for the 
EU and its businesses. They want to have 
the same access to central, state and 
local government contracts, accounting 
for nearly 13% of India‘s GDP, as local sup-
pliers. This, however, would seriously un-
dermine India‘s policy space to channel 
public spending to SMEs, marginalised 
groups such as women and to poorer re-
gions to reduce social and economic ine-
quality219. In the current economic crisis, 
countries have widely used this policy 
space to stimulate domestic economies. 
In addition, European trade unions have 
warned that the liberalisation of public 
procurement markets can lead to a bias 
in favour of low wage, lost cost produc-
ers, including in the delivery of essential 
services220.
From a development and labour rights 
perspective, the joint Indian and Euro-
pean business demand to ease the 
movement of staff in transnational 
services companies is also not without 
its problems. A permanent outflow of 
skilled labour such as medical and IT per-
sonnel could mean a shortage of trained 
labour in India, tax losses, and the export 
of acquired skills and knowledge222. This 
is particularly worrying in the health sec-
tor, as India has the highest emigration 
rates for doctors in the developing world 
but is also way off target for meeting 
most of the health-related Millennium 
Development Goals, including infant 
mortality, malnutrition and maternal 
health. Trade unions have warned that 
the “unregulated temporary cross-bor-
der movement of employees... works 
to the detriment of workers and com-
munities both in the countries of origin 
and of destination”223. With ´ FTA-migrant 
workers´ most likely having fewer rights 
than their domestic colleagues, labour 
standards in host countries would be put 
under immense pressure while costs for 
social security would be dumped on the 
country of origin224.
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On both sides of the negotiations, the 
free trade talks between the EU and India 
are tailored to corporate interests. Both 
the EU Commission and the government 
of India have entered into a symbiotic 
working relationship with big corpora-
tions and their lobby groups. Both have 
put in place a dense web of corporate 
advisory bodies, working groups and 
consultation channels through which 
business can exercise undue influence 
over trade-policy making. And both 
largely ignore people who stand up for 
a trade policy that acts in the interest of 
people‘s livelihoods.
Corporate lobbyists, on the other hand, 
flood the power hubs in Brussels and 
Delhi, jockeying for influence over neg-
otiators to gain the most from the FTA. 
While they do have competing interests, 
they also work together on issues such as 
the opening of the Indian retail market, 
the right to directly sue governments for 
hampering corporate profits, the unreg-
ulated movement of workers across the 
globe and increasingly also the tighten-
ing of intellectual property rights.
 6  conclUsIon
The result is a corporate-driven trade 
agenda with devastating impacts for 
those who are already on the lowest 
rung of the socio-economic ladder – 
whether they are farmers, workers or 
poor patients. The result is also a grave 
violation of the most basic democratic 
principles in the two self-proclaimed 
largest democracies of the world.
This must not continue. Both the Indian 
government and the EU institutions 
have a political responsibility to end 
their incestuous relationship with vested 
interest groups and develop a trade pol-
icy which prioritises social and ecological 
justice over corporate interests. As a first 
step, both sides should halt the EU-India 
FTA negotiations until:
all existing negotiating positions, draft 
proposals, stakeholder contributions 
and government commissioned stud-
ies are made public;
comprehensive impact assessments 
and meaningful, broad consultations 
with the most affected groups in Eur- 
ope and India have taken place;
they have put an end to their habit of 
joint-policy making with big business;
development, livelihoods, food sover-
eignty, environmental, social and gen-
der justice form the core of their trade 
policy agenda.
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European Automobile Manufacturers Association
Automotive Component Manufacturers Association of India
American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India
Association of Poultry Processors and Poultry Trade in the EU countries
Federation of German Industries
European Chemical Industry Council
Confederation of European Paper Industries
Chief Executive Officer
Confederation of the Food and Drink Industries of the EU
Confederation of Indian Industry
Liaison Centre for the Meat Processing Industry in the European Union
Directorate General (of the European Commission)
European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company
European Business Group
European Business and Technology Centre
European Crop Protection Association
European Dairy Association
Europe Express Association
European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations
European Free Trade Association
Europe India Chamber of commerce
Economic Partnership Agreement
European Federation of Public Services Unions
European Services Forum
European Retail Roundtable
European Tyre & Rubber Manufacturers‘ Association
European Union
Foreign Direct Investment
Federation of Enterprises in Belgium
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
Free Trade Agreement
Gender-Related Development Index
Gross Domestic Product
High-Level Trade Group
Intra-Corporate Transferees
Indian Rupee
Intellectual Property Right
Information Technology
French Confederation of Industries
Ministry of Commerce and Industry (in India)
National Association of Software Companies
Non-Governmental Organisation
Non-Tariff Barrier
EU regulatory framework for Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals
Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers
Small and Medium Enterprise
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
Union of Industrial and Employers‘ Confederation of Europe (now BusinessEurope)
World Health Organisation
World Trade Organisation
ACEA
ACMA
AmCham EU
ASEAN
ASSOCHAM
AVEC
BDI
CEFIC
CEPI
CEO
CIAA
CII
CLITRAVI
DG
EADS
EBG
EBTC
ECPA
EDA
EEA
EFPIA
EFTA
EICC
EPA
EPSU
ESF
ERRT
ETRMA
EU
FDI
FEB
FICCI
FTA
GDI
GDP
HLTG
ICT
INR
IPR
IT
MEDEF
MOCI
NASSCOM
NGO
NTB
REACH
SIAM
SME
TRIPS
UEAPME
UNICE
WHO
WTO
aBBrEvIaTIons
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